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ABSTRACT 
 
Anonymous, Authentic, and Accountable Resource Management based on the E-cash 
Paradigm. (May 2008) 
Tak Cheung Lam, B. S., The Chinese University of Hong Kong; 
M. S., The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Jyh-Charn (Steve) Liu 
 
The prevalence of digital information management in an open network has driven 
the need to maintain balance between anonymity, authenticity and accountability (AAA). 
Anonymity allows a principal to hide its identity from strangers before trust relationship 
is established. Authenticity ensures the correct identity is engaged in the transaction even 
though it is hidden. Accountability uncovers the hidden identity when misbehavior of the 
principal is detected. The objective of this research is to develop an AAA management 
framework for secure resource allocations. Most existing resource management schemes 
are designed to manage one or two of the AAA attributes. How to provide high strength 
protection to all attributes is an extremely challenging undertaking. Our study shows that 
the electronic cash (E-cash) paradigm provides some important knowledge bases for this 
purpose. Based on Chaum-Pederson’s general transferable E-cash model, we propose a 
timed-zero-knowledge proof (TZKP) protocol, which greatly reduces storage spaces and 
communication overheads for resource transfers, without compromising anonymity and 
accountability. Based on Eng-Okamoto’s general divisible E-cash model, we propose a 
 iv 
hypercube-based divisibility framework, which provides a sophisticated and flexible way 
to partition a chunk of resources, with different trade-offs in anonymity protection and 
computational costs, when it is integrated with different sub-cube allocation schemes. 
Based on the E-cash based resource management framework, we propose a privacy 
preserving service oriented architecture (SOA), which allows the service providers and 
consumers to exchange services without leaking their sensitive data. Simulation results 
show that the secure resource management framework is highly practical for mission-
critical applications in large scale distributed information systems.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The prevalence of digital information management in an open network has driven 
a new level of expectation on security and privacy protection. One of the key issues is to 
maintain the fragile balance between anonymity, authenticity, and accountability (AAA). 
In a hostile environment, a principal may want to remain its identity anonymous when it 
communicates with strangers. In the mean, the principal also wants to guarantee that the 
stranger is a valid user with an authentic identity to take part in the communications. An 
authentic identity needs to be unveiled to account for misbehaviors from the ill-minded 
adversary in the group. Balance of the AAA strengths calls for a holistic design strategy 
in large-scale, distributed information systems. One must carefully adjust the strengths 
between the three management arms to yield the highest productivity for mission-critical 
applications.  
 The objective of this research is to develop secure resource allocations in an open 
network based on the AAA management criteria. Different from tangible resources 
which can be transferred physically, allocation of digital resources is essentially an 
exchange of authentication messages which claim the ownership of the resources. AAA 
management allows an anonymous principal to prove the ownership of its resources, and 
at the same time, it allows identification of the principal who transfers the ownership 
which has been transferred to others, via replay of authentication messages. One solution  
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of IEEE Transactions on Networking. 
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approach is to relay all messages via a trusted server but then the trusted server becomes 
a single point of failure because any malfunctions of the trusted server will cease all 
system activities immediately. We will show that with proper enhancements on the 
electronic cash (E-cash) framework, one can manage the AAA attributes for resource 
allocations with minimum interventions from the trusted server.  
 E-cash was originally designed to support secure, anonymous transactions and 
culprit identifications for digital currency duplications. Distinguished from other digital 
payment systems, E-cash requires no centralized supervisions in the transaction phase. 
The elegant cryptographic constructs of E-cash provide important knowledge bases for 
the designs of secure resource allocations. Based on the E-cash framework, a principal 
can transfer the ownership of its resource (or money) to another principal. During the 
transfer, the transferring principal needs to show the proof of ownership. At the same 
time, the proof must not leak its user identity to the receiving principal unless a double-
transfer violation occurs. A double-transfer violation occurs when a principal duplicates 
the proof of ownership and transfers them to different principals. The design of E-cash 
ensures that the user identity of the double-transfer violator can be deciphered from the 
proofs after-the-fact. In this dissertation, we investigated two major topics related to E-
cash based resource allocation: transferability management and divisibility management.  
 Transferability is a fundamental need for secure resource allocations but it is also 
proven a costly operation under the general transferability model (GTM) [1]. We 
proposed a timed zero-knowledge proof (TZKP) protocol which drastically reduces the 
storage size and the communication overheads from O(n) to constant, where n is the total 
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number of transfers occurred in the system. We will show that, by proper incorporation 
of session time into GTM, a principal can regularly discard the outdated log files, 
without losing track of potential double-transfer offenders. In contrast, original GTM 
requires the log files to be kept forever in order to guarantee accountability of double-
transfer offenders. We will also show that, by distinguishing the multi-source condition 
from the same-source condition, and including them as a deciphering trigger in GTM, a 
principal can reuse a single token to exercise unlimited number of legitimate transfers, 
without leaking its user identity. In contrast, original GTM requires the principal to 
withdraw a new (dummy) token for each transfer in order to guarantee anonymity for the 
transferring principal. Since withdrawal is typically the most expensive operation in E-
cash systems, the proposed reusable token significantly reduces the system overheads for 
E-cash based resource allocations.  
Divisibility is useful to manage a chunk of resources using minimum number of 
tokens. A principal can use a single token to generate the ownership proofs for different 
divisions from the resource chuck, instead of using one token for each atomic unit of the 
chunk. We proposed a hypercube-based divisibility framework, which expands the 
number of possible divisibility configurations from O(2m+1) to O(3m), in contrast to the 
tree-based framework of the general divisibility model (GDM) [2], where m is the 
number of bits to represent an atomic unit of the resource chunk. We analyzed the 
cryptographic constraints to maintain the AAA balance in the hypercube-based 
divisibility framework, and derived a scheme which yields better performance by a 
relaxed anonymity constraint. Simulation results show that my scheme assures 
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anonymity at a small extra cost of fragmentation (< 2%) under an unrestrictive sub-cube 
allocation scheme. Moreover, such a small cost can further be eliminated (0%) when 
restrictive sub-cube allocation schemes, such as binary code (BC) and binary reflected 
gray code (BRGC), are used to distribute resources [3]. It suggests that with proper 
adjustments to both the divisible tokens and resource allocation rules, highly secure and 
efficient resource management schemes can be developed based on one integrated 
framework.  
Based on the above secure resource management solutions, we proposed a 
privacy-preserving framework for the reservation-based service oriented architecture 
(SOA). In the proposed system, a registered service consumer can reserve services 
(resources) from the service provider. The service consumer can choose to transfer the 
service reservation to another consumer. The service provider provides service to 
anyone who can present a valid service reservation. Although the E-cash paradigm 
paved a solid foundation for the protection of user identity in the above scenario, there is 
a missing link is on the privacy protection of inquiry and service contents during service 
discovery. To bridge this gap, we interfaced the E-cash based resource management 
framework with a peer-to-peer (P2P) system, CHORD [4], and extended its lookup 
protocol with the multi-layer Bloom filter (MLBF) [5], so that the service consumer can 
query other peer nodes for wanted services while those peer nodes do not have 
knowledge on both the inquiry and service contents. Such a privacy protection is 
important for collaborations between competing parties in a hostile environment. In 
addition, we proposed a secret handshake (SH) protocol to control the release of 
 5 
sensitive information to anonymous party based on different qualifications, trust levels, 
capabilities, rights, or privileges represented by the group. The proposed SH protocol 
allows two anonymous principals to use their SH tokens to authenticate each other 
whether or not they belong to the same group. If they belong to the identical group, they 
are able to establish a common secret key for further transaction actions. Otherwise, they 
are not able to recognize the group identity of one another. The proposed protocol allows 
reuse of the SH token in different transactions without leaking information of the user 
identity. In contrast, the existing work which uses 2 pairing operations requires the 
withdrawal of a new SH token for each transaction in order to guarantee anonymity [6]. 
And the existing work [7] which supports reuse of token requires 6 pairing operation [8]. 
Our protocol provides a light-weight group authentication mechanism to filter strangers 
from different groups before proceeding to the more sophisticated authentications for the 
transaction phase in resource allocations. Preliminary experimental results show that the 
proposed secure resource management framework is highly practical for mission-critical 
applications in large scale distributed information systems.  
The following sections of this dissertation are organized as follows. Section II 
introduces the background of the E-cash paradigm and its unified framework for secure 
resource allocations. Sections III and IV explain the transferability management and the 
divisibility management for secure resource allocations, respectively. Section V presents 
the reservation-based SOA in a P2P environment. Section VI provides a summary of the 
research work.  
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II. E-CASH PARADIGM 
 
 Electronic cash, or E-cash, was first proposed by Chaum in [9] to support secure 
anonymous transactions. Distinguished from other electronic payment systems, E-cash 
does not require online supervisions from the trusted third party during the transaction 
phase. Therefore, it is usually regarded as the off-line payment model. Although E-cash 
has not been broadly deployed to replace the paper-based currency, mainly due to non-
technical concerns [10], its elegant cryptographic constructs for off-line authentications 
and privacy protection have offered important knowledge bases for the development of 
large-scale critical applications at different clearance levels. Examples include, but not 
limited to, electronic voting [11], population survey [12], collaborations with competing 
parties [13], role based information sharing [14], and mobile agent tracking system [15]. 
In this section we will introduce the E-cash paradigm and based on it to develop a secure 
resource management framework.  
 
A. E-cash Basic Operations 
 
The basic operations in the E-cash paradigm are depicted in Fig. 1. In its original 
form, a principal needs to register an account from the bank. Then, the bank will assign 
an identity (account number) to the principal and maintain the records of the principal. A 
registered principal can withdraw some tokens from the bank. Each token has a unique 
serial number signed by the bank. The serial number is associated with the encrypted 
 7 
identity of the principal and some secrets for proving the ownership of the token. The 
principal (payer) can spend the token to another principal (payee). The spent token is an 
encrypted form of the token called the credential. The payee verifies the credential and 
deposits the credential to the bank. The credentials received by the payees or deposited 
to the bank cannot be associated with the payer’s identity unless the payer spends the 
same token again to another transaction. This is called the double spending offense. The 
double spending identification (DSI) system can decipher the identity of double spending 
offender from the involved credentials. From the above description, the E-cash paradigm 
demonstrated a harmonic AAA balance between three types of principals: the payer can 
stay anonymous; the payee can assure the transaction made by the payer is authentic; the 
bank can assure that double spending offense is accountable. This simple AAA model is 
the foundation of our secure resource management framework in subsequent discussions. 
 
 
Fig. 1: AAA relationship in the E-cash paradigm. 
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B. E-cash High Level Construct 
 
E-cash involves a myriad of cryptographic tools which interlocked relationship is 
carefully exercised to satisfy the AAA requirement simultaneously. In this section, we 
will introduce three cryptographic primitives commonly used by E-cash constructs: blind 
signature schemes [9, 16-21], zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) protocols [22-27], and secret 
sharing schemes [28-35]. A high level construct is described in Fig. 2. 
  
1. Blind signature schemes 
 
Blind signature schemes [9] allow the bank to sign a message without knowing 
the exact message contents. In E-cash, the signed message refers to the serial number of 
the token. Therefore, the bank is not able to associate the serial number from deposited 
credential with the principal’s identity from the withdrawal record. A simple example of 
blind signature scheme is described as follows. Let (e, n) and (d, p, q) be the RSA public 
keys and private keys of the bank respectively. The principal wants to receive the bank’s 
signature on message M without letting the bank know the plaintext of M.  
BLIND: The principal randomly generates an integer r and send re⋅M mod n to the bank. 
SIGN: The bank sends the signature (re⋅M mod n)d mod n = r⋅Md mod n to the principal. 
UNBLIND: The principal retrieves the signature by ((r⋅Md mod n)/r) mod n = Md mod n. 
VERIFY: The bank’s signature on M is correct if (Md mod n)e mod n = M. 
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Fig. 2: High level constructs of E-cash system. 
 
In the above simple example, the bank has no knowledge on the signed message 
M, because it does not know the random number r. In E-cash systems, the bank does not 
know the signed serial number of the token but it also needs to guarantee that the signed 
serial number is associated with the encrypted identity of the principal. It requires more 
advanced schemes such as randomized blind signature [36]. Advanced blind signature 
schemes induce severe overheads for the withdrawal operations in most E-cash schemes. 
In this dissertation, instead of designing efficient blind signatures for E-cash, our scheme 
minimizes the number of withdrawal operations needed to reduce the system overheads.  
 
2. Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) protocol 
 
 Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) protocols [22] allow a principle (prover) to prove 
to another principal (verifier) that the presented message is associated with some secrets 
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under certain constraints but not allowing the verifier to know the secrets. In E-cash, the 
presented message refers to the serial number of the token, which is associated with the 
encrypted identity of the principal and some secrets for the principal to prove the token’s 
ownership. It guarantees that the identity of the principal cannot be deciphered from the 
credential. A simple example of ZKP protocol is described as follows. Let (e, n) and (d, 
p, q) be the RSA public keys and private keys of the payer. The payer presents the public 
keys to the payee and wants to prove that it knows the private counterparts.  
WITNESS: The payer publishes (e, n) to the payee.  
CHALLENGE: The payee randomly generates a message M and sends it to the payer. 
RESPONSE: The payer signs M and returns the signature Md mod n to the payee. 
VERIFY: It is proven that the payer knows (d, p, q) if (Md mod n)e mod n = M. 
In the above simple example, adversaries cannot pretend to know the private part 
by replaying the response because the challenge M is unpredictable. This challenge-and-
response approach of ZKP is broadly used in E-cash systems. First, the payer presents 
the serial number of token to the payee. Then, the payee sends back a random challenge 
to the payer. The payer needs to sign the challenge message by the secrets of the token to 
give the response. Different from the simple example, the payee can verify the response 
message using the public parameters from the bank, instead of the individual public keys 
of the payer. It guarantees that no individual public keys can be linked to two payments 
of the same payer. Another difference is that typical ZKP protocols aim to protect secrets 
unconditionally while ZKP protocols used in E-cash systems need to decipher the secrets 
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(identity) on double-spending offense. Therefore, ZKP protocols used in E-cash systems 
are usually integrated with secret sharing schemes.  
 
3. Secret sharing scheme 
 
 Secret sharing schemes [28] allows a secret message to be encrypted in multiple 
secret shares. A (k, n) secret sharing scheme guarantees that any k out of n secret shares 
can be used to reconstruct the secret message while fewer than k secret shares cannot. In 
E-cash systems, the secret message refers to the identity of the payer. The payer needs to 
produce one secret share to the payee. If the payer doubly spends the token and produces 
multiple secret shares, its identity can be involuntarily deciphered from the secret shares 
when their credentials are deposited to the bank. A simple example of a secret sharing is 
described as follows. Let (a0, …, ak-1) be the secret message to be encrypted in the (k, n) 
secret sharing scheme: 
f(x) = a0 + a1⋅x + a2⋅x2 + … + ak-1⋅ xk-1                           (2.1) 
SECRET SHARING: Compute the i th secret share (xi, f(xi)), for some xi, i = 0, …, n -1.  
SECRET RECOVERY: Use any k secret shares to construct k polynomials by (2.1). The 
secret message (a0, …, ak-1) can be recovered by interpolations of the k polynomials.  
 In this above simple example, the secret message is selected by the payer. On the 
other hand, E-cash systems have to enforce the payer to use its secret identity to produce 
the secret shares so that double spending offenses are accountable. Thus, secret sharing 
schemes in E-cash systems are usually integrated with ZKP, as we have mentioned in the 
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previous section. As we will see in subsequent discussions, the integrated constructs of 
secret sharing scheme and ZKP protocol form strong bonding among the AAA attributes 
for secure resource management. 
 
C. E-cash Design Space 
  
 Numerous E-cash branches were proposed in the past two decades with different 
emphasis on linkability, traceability, transferability, divisibility, and token revocation, as 
depicted in Fig. 3. In this section, we will give a brief introduction to various branches 
and discuss their relationship. These branches inspired a very rich design space for 
mission-critical applications with similar AAA needs.  
 
1. Linkability 
 
Two credentials are linkable to a principal if the principal can determine whether 
or not both the credentials are produced by the same payer while the principal does not 
necessarily knowing the payer’s identity. Two credentials involved in a double spending 
need to be linkable in order to enable DSI operations. Thus, linkability is usually used to 
describe the credentials without involved in a double spending offense.  
Linkability can further be classified into multi-token linking, same-token linking, 
and sub-token linking. Multi-token linking is the case when the linkable credentials are 
produced by different tokens. It is useful to defense against misbehaviors such as money 
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laundering [37]. Same-token linking refers to the case when the linkable credentials are 
produced by the same token. A special case known as forward linkability occurs when a 
credential revisits the same payer after a series of transfers which is proven inevitable in 
the off-line model [1]. Sub-token linking refers to the case when the linkable credentials 
represent sub-values of a divisible token. Sub-token linking appears in most divisible E-
cash schemes [2, 38-40] with the exceptions of [41, 42]. 
 
  
Fig. 3: E-cash design space. 
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2. Traceability 
 
A credential is traceable to a principal if the principal can associate the credential 
with the withdrawal records of the token which generated this credential. Similar to the 
linkability, traceability is usually used to describe the credentials without involved in a 
double spending offense.  
Traceability can further be categorized into coin tracing and owner tracing. Coin 
tracing refers to the case when a principal other than the payer can tell the serial number 
of the credential before the token is spent. It is necessary to create a token revocation list 
[46]. Owner tracing refers to the case when a principal other than the payer can tell the 
payer’s identity after the token is spent. It directly implies that the credential is linkable 
to the principal. Owner tracing is usually enabled by a trusted third party other than the 
bank to catch the misbehaviors in addition to double spending. Typically, the bank needs 
to use some public parameters of the trusted third party to create the token, and the bank 
needs the trusted third party to use it private keys to decipher the identity of the offender 
from the credential.  
 
3. Transferability 
 
An E-cash scheme is transferable if the received money, privileges, resources, or 
assets represented by a credential can further be spent to other principals without having 
to deposit it to the bank first. A number of transferable schemes are proposed [1, 43, 44]. 
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A non-transferable scheme can be transformed into a transferable scheme by the general 
technique proposed in [1]. By using this technique, the payer needs to spend a (dummy) 
transfer token in each transfer, and the same transfer token cannot be reused in the next 
transfer, or otherwise, the payer’s identity is traceable from the credentials produced by 
the same transfer token. As a result, the payer needs to withdraw many transfer tokens in 
order to execute multiple transfers, causing unnecessarily high system overheads. In this 
dissertation, we will explain how to mitigate these withdrawal overheads by constructing 
a reusable transfer token and discuss the impacts on the traceability and linkability.  
 
4. Divisibility 
 
An E-cash scheme is divisible if a token can be spent for multiple times in such a 
way that each credential produced from it represents a subdivision of money, privileges, 
resources, or assets. Each subdivision is weighted by a value. Double spending occurs if 
the total values spent exceed the permitted quota. Typically, divisible E-cash schemes 
are either coupon-based [37, 39, 41, 45] or tree-based [2, 38, 40, 42]. In coupon-based 
schemes, the values of subdivisions are uniformly distributed. In contrast, in tree-based 
schemes, a tree node at level i of the tree represents 1/2i of the allowed quota value. In 
this dissertation, we developed a hypercube-based divisible scheme which supports more 
subdivision configurations than tree-based schemes. We will show that owner tracing is 
possible, although unlikely, in the hypercube-based scheme when an unrestrictive sub-
cube allocation scheme is used. We will also show that the chance of owner tracing can 
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be dropped to zero if the hypercube-based scheme is integrated with some other well-
known sub-cube allocation schemes.  
 
5. Token revocation 
 
When a token is revoked, the permitted quota of the token will drop to zero, and 
no more transfer made by the token is allowed. Revocable schemes usually require coin-
tracing ability to black list the revoked serial numbers [46, 47]. In this dissertation, We 
will discuss the use of session time to invalidate an expired token for E-cash schemes 
without coin-tracing ability.  
 
D. E-cash Based Resource Management Framework 
 
An E-cash based resource management framework is shown in Fig. 4. It contains 
three major types of principals, the central authority (CA), resource owner, and resource 
consumer, and five major operations, withdrawal, allocation, transfer, consumption, and 
DSI. The CA and resource owner are assumed well-known to the resource consumers.  
In Fig. 4, the resource owner possesses a chunk of resources represented by the 
hypercube G4 = ××××, where × denotes the “don’t care” bit. The resource owner wants 
to allocate the access rights for parts of its resources, represented by the sub-cubes, to the 
resource consumers. In order to participate to resource allocations/transfers, the resource 
consumers U0, U1, U0’ and U1’ first withdraw some tokens from the CA. On the requests 
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of U0 and U0’, the resource owner allocates sub-cubes 0××× and 1××× to U0 and U0’, 
respectively. U0 transfers sub-cubes 0×0× and 0×10 to U1 and U1’, respectively, and lets 
itself consume the sub-cube 0×11 from the resource owner. Finally, U1 and U1’ consume 
sub-cubes 0×0× and 0×10 from the resource owner, respectively. 
 So far none of the hypercube nodes is transferred or consumed more than once. 
Thus, the resource access provided by 0×××
 
=
 
{0×0×,
 
0×10,
 
0×11} is completed at the 
resource owner’s site after U1 and U1’ finish their consumptions. Ideally, the credentials 
produced by these consumers should be untraceable and unlinkable. However, a double 
spending occurs when U0’ consumes the sub-cube 11×× from the resource owner while 
it transfers the sub-cube 1×1× to U1’ because the sub-cube 111× = {1110, 1111} is used 
twice. The DSI system must assure identification of U0’. Optionally, token revocation 
can be used to prevent further violations of this resource consumer. 
 
 
Fig. 4: E-cash based resource management framework.  
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 The E-cash paradigm provided solid knowledge bases for the designs of secure 
resource management in a hostile peer-to-peer environment. However, directly applying 
E-cash may not be the most efficient mean to secure distributed systems, because it was 
originally designed for monetary applications only. In this dissertation we will adjust the 
E-cash algorithm to secure resource allocations with improved efficiency and flexibility.  
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III. TRANSFERABILITY MANAGEMENT 
 
Transferability is important for resource management to switch the ownership for 
digital resources, assets or privileges from one principal to another principal. The E-cash 
paradigm provides elegant cryptographic constructs for transferability management but it 
induces serious system overheads under Chaum-Pedersen’s general transferability model 
(GTM) [1, 48]. To make E-cash applicable to secure resource management, we proposed 
timed zero knowledge proof (TZKP) protocol for session-based access control of shared 
resources in an open environment. The main idea is to manipulate the anonymity control 
variables in Eng-Okamoto’s general disposable authentication (GDA) model1 [2] so that 
session time and source of transfer can be embedded into GDA as one of the decipher 
conditions. As a result, resource access authorizations assigned for different sessions (or 
transferred from distinct sources) can be managed independently by a single reusable 
token without compromising the anonymity requirement. At the same time, the 
credentials which have passed the current session can be safely discarded without 
weakening the accountability requirement. Our scheme maintains the AAA balance with 
a reduced number of tokens withdrawn and a reduced number of credentials stored. They 
are both reduced from O(n) to constant where n is the number of transfer operations.  
 
                                                 
1
 The GDA model in this dissertation refers to the general construct of disposable authentication 
in the second part of [2], but not the specific construct in first part of [2] or the specific construct 
in [49]. 
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 One of the most critical concepts in our scheme is the timed access authorization 
(TAA). TAA is granted by the service provider to the service consumer when the service 
consumer requests a reservation of services (resources). It contains the service provider’s 
signature on three messages: (i) the scheduled time for service redemption, (ii) the public 
part of the consumer’s token, and (iii) the description of services. The consumer needs to 
present a valid TAA and the public part of its token in order to redeem services from the 
service provider at scheduled session. Coupling of session time and token in TAA allows 
the service provider to save storage by discarding the credentials associated with expired 
TAAs. In contrast, traditional schemes need to maintain credentials indefinitely to catch 
the service consumers from using aged tokens to redeem services. However, an improper 
use of TAA may lead to anonymity breaching of service consumers. We will show that 
our scheme can prevent adversaries from misusing expired credentials intentionally 
stored at the service provider. Our scheme guarantees the accountability for the service 
provider with reduced system overheads but not sacrificing the anonymity of honest 
service consumers. 
Another critical concern is about the TAA transfers among service consumers. In 
additional to the original TAA issued from the service provider, a service consumer must 
be able to use its own token to receive and pass on the TAA to another service consumer. 
Different parts of the token is used for receiving and passing on the TAA. The TAA and 
the credentials produced by all service consumers who transferred this TAA are together 
called the cascaded credential. The cumulative size of the cascaded credential after each 
transfer is proven inevitable [1] thus there is no room to reduce bandwidth and storage in 
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this direction. On the other hand, the cost of token withdrawal per transfer operation can 
be significantly reduced by using the multi-source reusability (MSR) condition proposed 
in this section. Based on the MSR condition, the service consumer can transfer a number 
of TAAs anonymously without withdrawing a new token provided that these transfers do 
not constitute a double-transfer of TAA. A double-transfer happens when the number of 
TAAs passed on is more than received by the service consumer. The concept of double-
transfer is mixed together with double-spending (reuse) of token in GTM. The main idea 
of MSR is to distinguish these two concepts and reflect their difference in the anonymity 
control variables of GDA. As a result, anonymity of rule-abiding service consumers can 
be guaranteed with much fewer withdrawal operations owing to the reusability of tokens. 
At the same time, we will show that accountability for double-transfer offense is assured 
in our scheme even under attacks from a series of colluders.  
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Section A explains the protocol 
details for session-based management and the MSR condition. Sections B and C present 
security and complexity analysis. Section D delivers simulation results to demonstrate 
the applicability. Run time for token withdrawal and service redemption are within the 
range of seconds, making it highly practical to the secure access control of large scale 
Internet resources. Section E introduces the related work. Section F provides a summary 
of this section.  
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A. Timed Zero-Knowledge Proof (TZKP) Protocol 
 
TZKP is designed for AAA management of shared resources at reduced system 
overheads comparing with the GDA model. TZKP consists of two major cryptographic 
modifications to the GDA model. The first one allows the service provider to issue TAA 
based on a signed session time bundled with the public data of the requester’s token. The 
second one allows the service consumer to transfer numerous TAAs it received to other 
consumers by using the same token it possesses, and still assures the anonymity. In this 
section, we will introduce the system architecture for AAA resource management and 
then explain the details for the two modifications on the GDA model.  
 
1. System overview 
 
The system architecture depicted in Fig. 5 is similar to the one we have discussed 
in Fig. 4. However, in this section we emphasize on the transferability management 
while divisibility will be discussed in the next section. Following the generic architecture 
for shared resource access, there are three types of principals: the central authority (CA), 
the service provider, and the service consumer. The CA is responsible for issuing tokens 
to service consumers, while the service provider is responsible for issuing TAAs to 
service consumers, and rendering services to service consumers at authorized session 
time. The service consumer can choose to redeem services by using its TAA, or transfer 
it to other service consumers.  
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Fig. 5: Service model and adversary behaviors. 
 
A consumer needs to first withdraw a token from the CA before it can request a 
TAA from the service provider, transfer TAAs to other consumers, and redeem services 
from the service provider. The consumer needs to use its token and TAA for transfer and 
service redemption. Having a token withdrawn from the CA, the consumer can initiate a 
service request by presenting the public part of its token, and the requested session time 
to access resources. The service provider grants the request by generating a TAA, which 
includes the signature on the bundled session time and the public data of the consumer’s 
token. Then, the consumer can use the TAA to redeem the services directly, or transfers 
the TAA to another consumer, i.e., transfer of a TAA from the grantor to the grantee. 
Transferability of TAA is highly desirable because it allows the creations of hierarchical 
distribution architecture for resource access privileges. It is consistent with the current 
practice in the large scale experimental facilities, such as DETER[54]. By using TZKP, 
TAA becomes void once it passes the scheduled time. The service provider can safely 
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discard the credentials which have passed the current session without affecting its ability 
to detect double-transfer for future sessions. Except for minor operational differences the 
same authentication process is applicable to both service redemption and TAA transfer. 
Informally, we can consider service redemption as a TAA transferred back to the service 
provider. Unless explicit clarification is necessary, we only discuss TAA transfer in the 
remaining discussions.  
TZKP is designed for rule-abiding consumers to manage access credits securely, 
while staying anonymous during operations. From the resource management viewpoints, 
it is easy to add TZKP to the existing resource sharing rules because it imposes virtually 
no restriction on how resources are reserved. The service provider simply stops issuing 
TAA when the reserved resources in a session time reach a target level. And redemption 
of services will be made to any principal who presents a valid credential, together with a 
valid TAA. For simplicity, we assume that the service provider has a free-run system 
clock. The time period of a session can range between minutes to hours for the shared 
resources because the computers often need to be reconfigured for various consumers. 
From the cryptographic analysis viewpoints, which are the focus of this paper, two main 
concerns need to be addressed. First, consumers may attempt to doubly transfer TAA in 
a session. Second, the service provider may attempt to decipher the consumers’ identities 
by collecting an infinite number of redeemed session credentials even though no double-
transfer of TAA in any session. we will show that neither of the two offenses can occur 
to TZKP, and the security properties of GDA are preserved within each session at 
reduced system costs.  
 25 
2. General disposable authentication (GDA) model 
 
The GDA model proposed by Eng-Okamoto in [2] is a versatile security control 
model which is compatible with various ZKP protocols designed for E-cash [36, 49-52]. 
In this section, we will explain the GDA basics needed to develop the TZKP protocol. 
The essence of GDA is summarized in Table 1, following the conventions defined in [2].  
 
Table 1: General disposable authentication (GDA). 
AAA Requirements Information Needed Remarks 
verify m = f(x) VU1: X, (E,
 
Y) X = F(x, r) = F’(m, r),  
Y = D(m, r, x, E), and  
m = f(x) iff G(m, X, E, Y) = “yes” 
decipher x DU1: (E, Y), r r = symmetric key to 
encrypt/decrypt x  
 DU2: (E,
 
Y), (E’,
 
Y’) (2, k) secret shares created by (x, r) 
Keep x secret Neither DU1 nor DU2 
available 
r = symmetric key to 
encrypt/decrypt x  
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In the GDA model, a prover U can prove that it possesses x, which satisfies m = 
f(x) for certain constraint f(⋅), without letting the verifier V know x, where x contains the 
registered identity of U. To perform the proof, U has to withdraw a token from the CA:  
     TK = (W, K),                                                       (3.1) 
where     
   W  = (b-signCA(m, X), m, X),                                       (3.2) 
and 
K  = (b-sign’CA(x, r), x, r).                                           (3.3) 
W and K, represent the public and private parts of TK, respectively. m is a unique 
message co-produced by U and the CA. m will be given to the verifier during the proof. 
b-signCA(⋅) and b-sign’CA(⋅) are blind signatures [9] of the CA. f(⋅) is a one-way function. 
r is a message randomly selected by U. The public counterpart of r is denoted by  
   X = F(x, r) = F’(m, r).                                             (3.4) 
F(⋅) and F’(⋅) are one-way functions. For a given token TK, the proof is done via 
the three-move protocol: U first sends W to V. V replies a randomly generated challenge 
message E. U must generate a response message,  
     Y = D(m, x, r, E),                                                   (3.5) 
where D(⋅) is the prover function. The messages resulted from the above are collectively 
called the credential, 
  CT = (W, E, Y),                                                     (3.6) 
and m = f(x) can be verified if the signature in (3.2) is valid, and (3.7) is satisfied: 
  G(m, X, E, Y) = “yes”,                                            (3.7) 
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where G(⋅) is the verifier function. x is decipherable if and only if either of the following 
conditions holds: 
DU1: (E, Y) and r are available, for Y produced from (x, r).  
DU2:  (E, Y) and (E’, Y’) are available where Y and Y’ are produced from the same  
  (x, r) and E ≠ E’.  
The deciphering condition DU1 is based on the fact that r is a symmetric key that 
encrypts/decrypts x to/from (E,
 
Y), and DU2 is based on the (2, k) secret sharing scheme 
[28], where k is an integer greater then two. DU2 is an important condition for the TZKP 
protocol design. Given the above facts, anonymity control of service consumers can be 
implemented by a simple time-stamping method: U first withdraws a token TK from the 
CA. From TK, U sends m to the service provider as the request to schedule a session for 
service redemption. The service provider grants a session time t to U by a TAA message:  
   TAA =  (signSP(t, m), t),                                           (3.8) 
where signSP(⋅) denotes the digital signature signed by the service provider. If the service 
provider provides various types of services, the type of services will also be included in 
the signature, which is not shown in (3.8) for simplicity. Later, when U wants to redeem 
the services, it adds TAA to the first move of protocol, and executes the second and the 
third moves as usual. Besides verifications in the original protocol, the service provider 
also needs to verify signSP(t, m) at session t. The main weakness of this scheme is that 
TK cannot be reused for different sessions. The proposed TZKP allows reuse of a token 
with protected anonymity for rule-abiding consumers so that the number of withdrawals 
of new tokens can be drastically reduced.  
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3. TAA generation: session time authorization 
 
TAA contains a service provider’s signature on the public part of the requesting 
consumer and the session time t authorized for the consumer to redeem the services. The 
consumer who is granted the TAA is eligible to use its token to redeem the services once 
within the period described by t. Requesting service redemption more than once within 
the period t will lead to double-spending of the token in GDA. The consumer’s identity 
will be involuntarily deciphered from the involved credentials. The credentials stored at 
the service provider can be discarded after t because the redemption of the same TAA 
requested after t will be rejected by the service provider. In contrast, without the notion 
of time in GDA (or t = ∞ ), the service provider will need to store credentials indefinitely 
to assure identification of possible service consumer who tries to redeem the same TAA 
again in the future.  
Now, we expand the scenario to consider a service consumer who is granted two 
TAAs bundled with sessions, t1 and t2, respectively. In GDA, the consumer will need to 
use two tokens to receive these two TAAs. Otherwise, when the consumer passes these 
TAAs to others, the same token will be used to create the credentials which by definition 
is a double-spending of token. If the service provider intentionally stores the expired 
credential after t1 (t1 < t2), then the service provider is able to decipher the consumer’s 
identity after collecting another credential at t2. The anonymity of service consumer is 
compromised because it never commits a double-transfer violation. To assure anonymity 
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of rule-abiding service consumers using GDA, a new token must be withdrawn from the 
CA for each TAA being granted, making unnecessarily high system overheads.  
One of the design goals of TZKP, in addition to the reduced credential storage at 
the service provider, is to allow proper reuse of token for redeeming services at different 
sessions so that the number of withdrawals can be greatly reduced. The challenging issue 
is how to do it without sacrificing the anonymity of rule-abiding service consumers and 
accountability on double-transfer of TAA. TZKP considers the signed session time t as 
an additional decipherability control variable so that the deciphering condition on the 
identity of service consumer depends not only on whether the token is reused (doubly 
spent) but also whether the reuse refers to the same TAA (doubly transferred).  
Recalled the GDA described in the previous section, X and its private counterpart 
(x, r) are control variables co-produced by the CA and the consumer in the withdrawal 
protocol. x, which contains the consumer’s identity, can be deciphered if a token is spent 
twice. Since X is determined at withdrawal, if a token is spent twice, the same X must be 
used to produce the two credentials, or otherwise the verification in (3.7) will fail. To 
make the token reusable for multiple sessions, TZKP takes X out of the token from the 
withdrawal protocol. The consumer must produce a new X value (using the same x but 
different r) together with the service provider for each requested session t so that each 
jointly produced value of X can be used one time only in the requested session, without 
causing deciphering of x. By producing different values of X for different sessions, the 
consumer does not need to withdraw new tokens. On the other hand, since t and X are 
bundled together by the service provider’s signature, redeeming services within t more 
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than once implies that (t, X) is used more than once to produce credentials. As a result, 
the consumer’s identity can be deciphered from the two credentials, just like the original 
GDA model. The new definition of the modified token TK = (W, K) in TZKP is:  
    W = (b-signCA(m), m),                                                (3.9) 
and     
K = (b-sign’CA(x), x),                                               (3.10) 
where the modified parameter is denoted by bold face. In contrast to (3.2) and (3.3), X 
and r are separated2 from W and K, respectively. Now U is free to select different values 
of r and X after withdrawal of TK. Each time when U requests a session t from the 
service provider, U
 
presents a unique X value and the message m from its token in the 
request. The service provider authorizes session t by signing a TAA message 
    TAA = (signSP(t, m, X), t).                                       (3.11) 
  Note the difference of (3.11) and (3.8) that X is included in TAA but not in TAA. 
When U redeems the services, it sends (TAA, W, X) in the first round of the three-move 
protocol and then executes the second and the third moves as usual. X is now an element 
of the modified credential 
    CT = (W, X, E, Y).                                            (3.12) 
  
                                                 
2
 One technique for such separations is to set r to be some publicly known constant value in 
withdrawal, and let the consumer choose its own r value during transfer. For example, r = 1 
when [36] is plugged in to GDA in [2].  
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 The modification from E to E will be discussed in (3.21) later. The verifications 
on CT are identical to those in the time-stamping approach introduced in section 3.2.1, 
except that correctness of (t, m, X) is checked by  
  signSP(t, m, X) and b-signCA(m),                               (3.13) 
instead of    
signSP(t, m) and b-signCA(m, X).                               (3.14) 
Anonymity of U is guaranteed provided that CT and CT’ are produced by the 
same token TK in distinct sessions. Although W and W’ have identical m, TAA and 
TAA’ have distinct values of (t,
 
X) and (t’,
 
X’). The same value of m implies that CT and 
CT’ are produced by the same token but the distinct values of (t,
 
X) and (t’,
 
X’) imply 
that the reuse of the token does not constitute a double-transfer of TAA because they are 
produced from different sessions. Since X and X’ are produced from (x,
 
r) and (x,
 
r’), 
respectively, it implies that (E,
 
Y) and (E’,
 
Y’) are produced from distinct values of (x,
 
r) 
and (x,
 
r’). Based on DU2, x cannot be deciphered from CT and CT’.  
It is straightforward to show that x can be deciphered when U doubly transfers a 
TAA in the same session. Therefore, it will not be discussed further.  
 
4. TAA transfer: multi-source reusability (MSR) 
 
For transfer of TAA, one could apply the GTM model to the GDA model, which 
suggests that a cascaded credential contains: 
(i)  A TAA message signed by the service provider, 
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(ii) The credentials produced by all consumers in the previous transfers of this TAA, and 
(iii) The credential produced in the current transfer. 
From (3.6) and (3.8), the cascaded credential in GDA is 
KCi = (TAA, CT1, CT2, …, CTi)                               (3.15) 
where CTj is the credential produced from Uj to Uj+1, and Ui and Ui+1 are the grantor and 
grantee in the current transfer respectively. As a general procedure to add transferability, 
Ui sends KCi-1 and Wi in the first round of the three-move protocol. In the second round, 
Ui+1 produces the challenge message as the hash value of its token public data, instead of 
a random number: 
Ei = H(Wi+1),                                                 (3.16) 
where H(⋅) denotes a collision-resistant one-way hash function. In the third round of the 
protocol, Ui sends the response to Ui+1 as usual. Then, Ui+1 needs to 
(i) verify TAA and each credential in KCi, and  
(ii) verify the linkage between each adjacent credential pair in KCi by (3.16). 
This step assures that all credentials on the cascaded credential can be verified 
for the said transfer. However, the weakness of this general approach is that the grantor 
needs to consume its token in each transfer because any reuse of token in GDA may 
compromise the anonymity of the grantor. We raise similar questions as in the earlier 
discussions:  
• When does a reuse (double-spending) of token constitute a double-transfer of TAA?  
• Can the consumer’s identity be deciphered from credentials produced by the reuse of 
a token when no TAA is doubly transferred? 
 33 
To answer these questions we propose the MSR condition which decides whether 
or not a reuse of token constitutes a double-transfer of TAA. Knowing their differences, 
we modify (3.16) and the cascaded credential format in (3.15) so that withdrawal of new 
token can be eliminated when each received TAA is transferred once only. Anonymity 
of the consumer needs to be protected in this case because the total amount of privileges 
carried by the received TAAs does not increase, i.e., no double-transfer. Based on MSR, 
deciphering condition on the consumer’s identity is not only determined by the session 
time, as discussed in the precious section, but also determined by where the TAA comes 
from, i.e., the source of the TAA. The modified cascaded credential becomes: 
KCi = (TAA, CT1, CT2, …, CTi).                          (3.17) 
Despite the similarity between (3.15) and (3.17), one must note that X1 is signed 
in TAA, but not in TAA. Xj is contained in Wj of CTj, but not in Wj of CTj. Given two 
cascaded credentials resulted from the double-transfers of TAA, the identity of consumer 
who made double-transfers can be deciphered based on DU2, using the two credentials 
positioned right after their longest common prefix. For the scenario depicted in Fig. 6, 
the identity of the double-transfer offender UC can be deciphered from CTC and CT’C.  
 
 
Fig. 6: Same-source transfers – a double transfer. 
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Fig. 7: Multi-source transfers – not a double transfer. 
 
 
Fig. 7a to Fig. 7c depict several scenarios that do not constitute a double-transfer. 
In Fig. 7a, UC needs to use its token to transfer TAAs from two distinct sources but such 
a transfer pattern does not inflate the access privileges of TAAs, and thus the identity of 
UC should be protected. In Fig. 7b, the two TAAs transferred from the same origin are 
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meant for distinct sessions and the identity of UC should be protected. Note that same-
source transfers are different from same-grantor transfers as depicted in Fig. 7b, where 
UC receives two TAAs from the same grantor but they are meant for distinct session 
times (TAA ≠ TAA’). Same-source transfers are also different from same-TAA transfer, 
as depicted in Fig. 7c, where UC may not realize that it is transferring the same (copy of) 
TAA. UC does not constitute a double-transfer offense in this case but UA does. The 
cryptographic constructs should allow deciphering of the identity of UA but not UC. We 
achieve this, we define the notions of same-source and multi-source transfers as follows: 
Definition 3.1: Two TAAs transferred from UC, to UD and UF, are from the same-source 
if, and only if     
KCD = (TAA, CT1, …, CT i, CT C),                            (3.18) 
and      
KCF  = (TAA’, CT’1, .., CT’j, CT’C)                        (3.19) 
have the common prefix 
(TAA, CT
 1, …, CT i) = (TAA’, CT’ 1, …, CT’i),              (3.20) 
for i ≤ j without loss of generality. Otherwise, they are from the multi-source.  
In summary, same-source transfer pattern constitutes a double-transfer violation 
while multi-source transfer pattern does not. A consumer should be allowed to reuse its 
token to make multi-source transfers with protected anonymity. Based on the analysis, 
we revise the three-move ZKP protocol so that the same-source transfers will guarantee 
identification of the double-transfer violator but the multi-source transfers will assure the 
consumer staying anonymous. 
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We attack this problem based on similar technique similar we discussed in last 
subsection via adjustments of X in GDA. A major difference between MSR enforcement 
and TAA issuance is that Xi cannot be signed by the service provider when the TAA is 
transferred from Ui to Ui+1. To overcome this, Xi is bundled with the grantor’s challenge 
message Ei-1 as follows: 
Ei = H(Yi-1, Wi+1, Xi+1).                                      (3.21) 
where Y0 = 0 by default. Now, for Ui to engage in multiple (multi-source) transfers with 
protected anonymity, Ui needs to choose different values of ri (and hence Xi) to produce 
its challenge message when Ui receives TAAs from different sources. When Ui passes on 
its TAAs, it can use different values of ri to produce its responses. The anonymity of Ui 
is protected because x cannot be deciphered by DU2. On the contrary, if Ui offenses in 
multiple (same-source) transfers, it will be forced to use the same value of ri (and hence 
Xi) when it passes on the TAAs. Otherwise, verifications in (3.21) will fail. The identity 
of Ui can be deciphered based on DU2, just like the GDA model.  
Note that, in additional to Xi+1, Yi-1 is also added to the hash inputs of (3.21). We 
will show next that including Yi-1 in this way is crucial to prevent the collusion attack 
between consumers upon forgery of cascaded credential.  
 
B. Security Analysis 
 
The major equation changes from GDA to TZKP are (3.8) to (3.11) and (3.16) to 
(3.21). The security analysis in this section will explain how such changes can guarantee 
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accountability to double-transfer violators, anonymity of rule-abiding service consumers, 
and authenticity of cascaded credentials under collusion attacks of malicious consumers.  
 
1. Accountability 
 
First, we will show that identification of double-transfer violators is guaranteed 
in GDA. Then, we will show how it can be guaranteed in TZKP via a different way to 
engage Xi. Suppose KCi is doubly transferred by Ui+1 in GDA. (mj, Xj), for j = 1, ..., i, 
cannot be forged because b-signCA(mj, Xj) is a secure signature. (t, m1) cannot be forged 
because it is signed by the service provider in (3.8). Based on this, and b-signCA(m1, X1), 
(m1, X1) is guaranteed intact with the TAA. Let (mj, Xj) be intact. We want to show that 
(mj+1, Xj+1) is also intact. In other words, if (mj+1, Xj+1) is used to receive a TAA, which 
KCi guarantees that (mj, Xj) is intact, then Uj+1 is not able to compute another (m’j+1, 
X’j+1) to transfer this TAA without failing any tests. The proof contains three parts. First, 
given CTj = (Wj, Ej, Yj), Uj+1 is not able to compute another E’j such that (Wj, E’j, Y’j) 
passes the test in (3.7). It is because Uj+1 has no knowledge on (xj, rj) to produce Y’j by 
(3.5). Second, Uj+1 is not able to compute another m’j+1 to produce Ej, which passes the 
test in (3.16). It is because H(⋅) is collision resistant. Third, Uj+1 is not able to compute 
another X’j+1 which produces b-signCA(mj, Xj). It is because the signature is secure. Based 
on the above arguments, and by mathematical induction, we conclude that Ui+1 must use 
the same (mi+1, Xi+1), and so the same (xi+1, ri+1), in both double-transfer instants. As a 
result, xi+1 can be involuntarily deciphered based on DU2.  
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Next, we will apply similar arguments to TZKP. Suppose KCi is doubly 
transferred by Ui+1. Instead of using b-signCA(mj, Xj) to guarantee the integrity of (mj, Xj) 
as in GDA, the integrity of (m1, X1) with the TAA is guaranteed by the service provider’s 
signature in (3.11) instead. Let (mj, Xj) be intact. We want to show that (mj+1, Xj+1) is also 
intact. The proof has two parts. First, given that CTj = (Wj, Xj, Ej, Yj), Uj+1 is not able to 
compute another E’j such that (Wj, Xj, E’j, Y’j) passes the test in (3.7). It is because Uj+1 
has no knowledge on (xj, rj) to produce Y’j by (3.5). Second, Uj+1 is not able to compute 
another (m’j+1, X’j+1) to produce Ej that passes the test in (3.21). It is because H(⋅) is 
collision-resistant. Since the association between mj+1 and Xj+1 has been verified in this 
step, there is no third step in this proof. Based on the similar arguments as in the proof 
for GDA, Ui+1 must use the same (mi+1, Xi+1), and so the same (xi+1, ri+1), in both double-
transfer instants. Based on DU2, xi+1 can be involuntarily deciphered. 
 
2. Anonymity 
 
Next, we will discuss how Xi+1 in (3.21) can allow reuse of token for multi-
source transfers with protected anonymity. Suppose that Ui+1 uses the same token to 
receive two TAAs from multi-source, which cascaded credentials are KCi and KC’i. 
Since the same token is used, the same mi+1 value will also be used. But different values 
of Ei and E’i can be used because Ui+1 can select different values of Xi+1 and X’i+1 to 
produce them, i.e., using (mi+1, ri+1) to receive one TAA, and (mi+1, r’i+1) to receive the 
other one. When Ui+1 passes on the two TAAs with KCi and KC’i, different ri+1 and r’i+1 
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are used to produce CTi+1 and CT’i+1, respectively, so based on DU2, xi+1 cannot be 
deciphered.  
 
3. Authenticity 
 
Finally, we explain why Yi-1 is needed in (3.21) to prevent credential forgery. So 
far Xi is considered a random value selected by Ui when the TAA is transferred from Ui 
to Ui+1. And Xi is bundled with Ei-1 of Ui-1, “before” it is used to produce CTi. As we 
have just shown, the ability in tracing double-transferring violators is equivalent to that 
of [1, 2] because they are identical except that integrity of Xi is protected by different 
means: (3.8) to (3.11) and (3.16) to (3.21). Nevertheless, when collusion is considered, 
CTi and KCi+1 can possibly be forged by a careful assignment of Xi before it is bundled 
with Ei. Followings we describe how such a forgery attempt is possible without Yi-1 in 
(3.21), and then prove how Yi-1 can prevent this from happening.  
In this forgery attack, Ui and Ui+1 are colluders. First, Ui+1 sends the challenge Ei 
= H(Wi+1, Xi+1) to Ui. Then, Ui arbitrarily selects Yi. Given the inverse function of G(⋅), 
Ui derives an Xi which satisfies G(mi, Xi, Ei, Yi) = “yes”, where mi is from a valid token 
of Ui. When Ui-1 transfers the TAA to Ui, Ui sends to Ui-1 the challenge message Ei-1 = 
H(Wi, Xi) in the second round of the three-move protocol. Then, Ui-1 replies by Yi-1 as 
usual. Now, Ui has all data available to forge a credential CTi = (Wi, Xi, Ei, Yi), and so the 
cascaded credential KCi to Ui+1. Ui+1 can transfer KCi to Ui+2 without anomaly detected. 
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Since Yi is selected by Ui arbitrarily without any encrypted data of its identity included, 
any violations done by Ui will not be identified.  
To prove that Yi-1 in (3.21) can prevent such a credential forgery under collusion 
attacks, we introduce a prior-knowledge graph analysis as depicted in Fig. 8a - Fig. 8c.  
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Fig. 8: Prior-knowledge graph analysis for TZKP. 
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The arrow pointing from P to Q implies that the creation of Q requires the prior 
knowledge of P. The solid line denotes the dependency when the three-move protocol is 
executed in a rule-abiding way. The dotted line denotes the dependency when this is 
executed based on forgery attempt. Derived from the dependency graph, we use the 
dependency formula,  
(P0, P1, …)  (Q0, Q1, …),                                    (3.22) 
to denote that the creations of all parameters in Q0, Q1, …, require the prior knowledge 
of some parameters in P0, P1,…, where Pi and Qi are simply data in the three-move ZKP 
protocol or themselves the dependency formulas. The dependencies are transitive, i.e., 
(P
 
V and V
 
Q) implies P
 
 Q.                            (3.23) 
Fig. 8a depicts the case when Yi-1 is removed from (3.21). CTi = (Wi, Xi Ei, Yi) 
can be forged by creating parameters in the following sequence: 
(((Wi+1Xi+1)  Ei), Yi, Wi) Xi .                           (3.24) 
From (3.24), all parameters to forge CTi are available to Ui, if Ui+1 gives Ui the prior 
knowledge of Wi+1 and Xi+1. Fig. 8b and Fig. 8c depict the cases when Yi-1 is included in 
(3.21). In Fig. 8b, we only consider the collusion of Ui and Ui+1, where the sequence of 
parameter creations is as follows: 
(((((Yi-1,(Wi+1Xi+1))Ei), Yi, Wi) Xi), Wi, Yi-2)(Ei-1Yi-1).       (3.25)  
From (3.25), a dependency loop (in bold lines of Fig. 8b) is formed, which means that 
the creation of Yi-1 requires the prior knowledge of Yi-1, which has a contradiction. The 
adversary has nowhere to initiate the malicious action, so the forgery attempt fails. Fig. 
8c considers a series of colluders. The dependencies trace all the way back until some Xj, 
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either j > 1 or j = 1. For j > 1, it means that Uj-1 is not a colluder, who computes Yj-1 from 
Ei-1, and then closes the loop. For j = 1, no dependency loop is formed, but X1 is signed 
by the service provider in TAA, so the forgery attempt fails again.  
 
C. Complexity Analysis 
 
The time and message size are measured based on three operations: withdrawal 
of tokens, transfer of cascaded credentials and detection of double transfers as described 
below: 
Tw = the total computation time for withdrawals 
Sw = the total communication message size for withdrawals 
Tf = the total computation time for transfers 
Sf = the total communication message size for transfers 
Td = the total search time from the database 
Sd = the total storage message size at the database 
 
The analysis is based on the scenario that the service provider grants p TTAs to a 
consumer. Each is legally transferred through the same set of q consumers before it is 
redeemed from the service provider. Table 2 is the summary of the complexity analysis. 
In GDA, since the reuse of a token is prohibited, the total number of withdrawals is the 
total number of transfers in the system, we have 
Tw = O(p⋅q) and Sw = O(p⋅q).                                 (3.26) 
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In TZKP, a consumer can reuse a token for any number of multi-source transfers. 
So, only one withdrawal is required for each consumer, i.e.,  
Tw = O(q) and Sw = O(q).                                      (3.27) 
 
Table 2: Complexity analysis for TZKP. 
Metrics GDA TZKP TZKP 
(Te/Tct = constant) 
Tw , Sw O(p⋅q) O(q)   O(1) 
Tf , Sf O(p⋅q2) 
(q unbounded) 
O(p⋅q2)  
(q < (Te / Tct)1/2) 
O(p) 
Td O(log p⋅q) O(log q) O(1) 
Sd O(p⋅q) O(q) O(1) 
 
For transfers of cascaded credentials the message size increases by one credential 
after each transfer in GDA and TZKP. The growing size also increases the computation 
time for the cascaded credentials. It is our desire to eliminate the cumulative overheads, 
but this has been proven inevitable [1]. Intuitive reason for this is that, every anonymous 
consumer along a series of transfers can be potentially a double-transfer offender. When 
the authorization is transferred, the consumer has to contribute part of its identity to the 
authorization data before it is circulated back for central inspection for double-transfer. 
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Therefore, regardless of the token, credential and protocol designs, the total transfers in 
the system have the following complexity: 
Tf = O(p⋅(1 + 2 +…+ q)) = O(p⋅q2)                           (3.28)  
and    
Sf = O(p⋅q2).                                                (3.29) 
In spite of the same complexity formula used in (3.28), it has subtly different 
implications to GDA and TZKP. In GDA, q is unbounded because the authorization will 
never expire, and it can be transferred indefinitely before service redemption. In contrast, 
in TZKP, we have 
q < Te/((1 + 2 + … + q)⋅Tct) < Te/(q⋅Tct)                     (3.30) 
  q < (Te/Tct)1/2,                                                              (3.31) 
where Te denotes the period starting from the authorization is granted from the service 
provider to the end of session, and Tct denotes the time required to verify one credential. 
This is derived from the fact that after a bounded number of transfers, the total time on 
cascaded credential verification in all transfers will exceed the allowed time for service 
redemption, and so, q cannot grow indefinitely. If (Te/Tct) is a (small) constant, then our 
solution is further optimized to:  
Tw = O(1),  Sw = O(1),                                      (3.32) 
and      
Tf = O(p),  Sf = O(p).                                        (3.33) 
To analyze the complexity for double-transfer detections, we consider that each 
credential received by the provider is sorted in its database, and matching an incoming 
 45 
credential with n credentials in the database is based on the O(log n) time algorithm. To 
guarantee identification of double-transfer offenders in GDA, the credentials cannot be 
discarded once they are received. Therefore, we have 
Sd = O(p⋅q),                                                  (3.34) 
and       
Td = O(log p⋅q).                                               (3.35) 
In TZKP, the credentials are kept only for one session of duration, and then they 
can be discarded after the examination of double-transfer violations. Suppose that the p 
TAAs are meant for p different sessions, we have   
Sd = O(q),                                                    (3.36)  
and 
 Td = O(log q).                                                (3.37) 
Again, if (Te/Tct) is a constant, then it can be further optimized to:  
Sd = O(1)                                                    (3.38) 
and       
Td = O(1).                                                   (3.39) 
 
D. Experimental Results 
 
We implemented TZKP protocol on top of the software architecture of CREAT 
(Cybersecurity Remote Education Access Tool), which binary version for the Windows 
operating system is available for download [53]. By plugging Ferguson’s e-coin scheme 
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[36] into GDA, with the modifications made to implement TAA and MSR in TZKP, we 
implemented the CA, the service provider, and the service consumer modules, and tested 
them on the DETER testbed [54]. As the system architecture depicted in Fig. 5, the CA 
node issues tokens to the consumer nodes. The service provider node grants TAAs to the 
consumer nodes. The consumer nodes request tokens from the CA, request TAAs from 
the service provider, redeem services from the service provider at scheduled time, and 
transfer the TAAs to other consumers. Key generation and other modular arithmetic are 
computed by the big integer library [55]. SHA-1
 
is used for one-way computations. A 
1024-bit RSA scheme is implemented for signature and other usages.   
To measure the run-times and the message sizes of withdrawals and transfers, we 
repeat each experiment by 1000 runs and take the average values. The CA node and the 
consumer machines are both equipped with 2.0 GHz Intel Pentium-4 processors, but the 
CA has 768M RAM, while the consumer has 512M. The simulation results are depicted 
in Tables 3 to 6. 1024-bit RSA is considered the standard key strength for contemporary 
technologies. Clearly, the runtime of TAA transfer increases linearly with the length of 
the cascaded credential, but in real world practice a limit is commonly set on the number 
of transfers due to the administrative boundary. The limitation is further affected by the 
duration of session. As such, one can expect a small number of transfers in each session. 
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Table 3: Runtime and message size of withdrawal. 
Metrics Values 
Total runtime (sec) 4.0 
Computation time (sec) 3.5 
Transmission time (sec) 0.5 
Token size (KB) 1.76 
 
Table 4: Runtime of the i-th transfer. 
i 1 5 10 15 
Time (sec) 1.7 7.2 12.9 19.1 
 
Table 5: Message size of the i-th transfer. 
i 1 5 10 15 
Size (K bytes) 2.17 9.87 19.5 29.1 
 
Table 6: Upper bounds on credential storage size. 
Te 60 120 240 480 
Size (K bytes) < 19.53 < 26.04 < 39.06 < 54.25 
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One can use the traditional ZKP protocol to achieve similar security goals, but it 
faces the following major drawbacks: (1) there is no hierarchical distribution of access 
privileges, (2) each token can only be used for one-time access of the requested resource, 
and (3) indefinite storage of credentials. In addition to storage overheads for credentials, 
identification of double-transfer offender in traditional ZKP protocol also significantly 
slows down with the number of spent tokens.  
Other statistics on the runtime and message size of TZKP are depicted in Fig. 9 
and Fig. 10. Experiments show that it takes about 4 seconds to withdraw a 1.7 KB token. 
The runtimes to transfer a cascaded credential (sized from 2KB to 30KB) increases from 
2 to 20 seconds when its length grows from 1 to 15, which is an extreme condition to test 
the viability of the proposed scheme.  
 
 
 
Fig. 9: Runtimes of withdrawal and transfer in TZKP. 
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Fig. 10: Message sizes of withdrawal and transfer in TZKP. 
 
E. Related Work 
 
ZKP protocol was broadly investigated mostly in the contexts of cryptographic 
constructs but there is rarely a cryptosystem which satisfies all requirements as in TZKP. 
For example, concurrent ZKP [56] considers time management in ZKP. It ensures the 
protections of “proof” and “zero-knowledge” when multiple ZKP instances are executed 
sequentially or in parallel. To guarantee such protections, concurrent ZKP requires both 
the prover and the verified to contribute some random numbers in each instance of the 
ZKP protocol and verify the consistency of the exchanged data, which is similar to the 
technique we adopted in TZKP. On the other hand, the hidden knowledge in concurrent 
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ZKP is protected unconditionally. It does not revoke the hidden knowledge such as the 
user identity on double-transfer violation events.  
E-cash systems [1] consider anonymity protection of the rule-abiding users and 
identification of double-transfer violators. Some E-cash systems support transferability 
and divisibility which are useful features for secure resource management. Nevertheless, 
E-cash does not have proper time management. As a result, each token can only be used 
one-time and all credentials have to be stored indefinitely, leading to severe withdrawal 
and storage overheads.   
Uncloneable group identification [57] introduces the notion of time management 
by associating session time with the random numbers engaged in the ZKP protocol. This 
technique is similar to the one we used in TZKP. And it also guarantees the revocation 
of anonymity on double spending events within the same session. However, uncloneable 
group identification does not consider transfers of authorization further from the receiver 
to another user. To do an authorization transfer, the user has to redeem the authorization 
from the central authority first. In contrast, TZKP can keep transferring the authorization 
from one another while the central authority remains offline.  
Proxy signature [58-63] is useful for transfers of authorizations from one to 
another without the online participation from the central authority. However, it usually 
requires the individual public key from every intermediate consumer (proxy signer) for 
signature verification. Verification of individual public keys could be expensive and may 
induce linkability of identity information if each user is associated with one public key 
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only. In contrast, TZKP only requires the users to verify the public key from the central 
authority.  
Group signature [64-69] is useful for verifying group membership without 
knowing the individual identity. However, the signature is usually not transferable, and 
the anonymity revocation is unconditionally controlled by the CA. In contrast TZKP 
allows the peer nodes to transfer and verify the credentials without the prior knowledge 
on the identity of each other, while it can still decipher the identities of double-transfer 
violators.  
 
F. Summary 
 
In this section, we proposed a timed ZKP (TZKP) protocol on the basis of GDA 
to support session-based access of computing resources for anonymous
 
consumers. In 
the classical GDM, a consumer can transfer its access authorization to another consumer 
without notifying the service provider but each transfer instance requires a spending of 
one consumer token, which contains the encrypted identity of the consumer, making this 
desirable feature costly. To minimize the overhead to withdraw new tokens, we propose 
the multi-source reusability (MSR) condition which allows a consumer to reuse its token 
for multiple transactions with protected anonymity unless a double-transfer of access 
authorization occurs. Furthermore, we propose the notion of timed access authorization 
(TAA) so that the service provider can eliminate the need to store and keep track of the 
spent tokens for double-transfer violation once their marked sessions are expired. TZKP 
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protocol prevents the service provider from compromising the anonymity of an honest 
consumer via misuse of expired spent tokens intentionally stored at the service provider, 
while drastically reducing the system overhead by allowing proper reuse of a token in 
different timed sessions. Implementation of TZKP is evaluated on the DETER testbed. 
The running time for computers with modest resources was found to be quite reasonable.  
The linkability of credentials deserves further investigations in the future. In the 
current construct, the credentials created by the reuse of token are linkable because they 
identical W. There is a tradeoff for the service consumer to choose fewer overheads with 
more reuse of token or less linkability by withdrawing more tokens. A possible solution 
to achieve unlinkability of credentials and reusability of token at the same time could be 
plugging unlinkable E-cash schemes such as [70] into our secure resource management 
framework. But the problem is that in the unlinkable scheme, W is not available to be an 
input of H(⋅) to produce the challenge message E. One candidate to replace W is the data 
used to detect double-spending in the unlinkable scheme because what we need is just to 
make sure that some common value (linkable) to be used on double-transfer offense and 
they could be different (unlinkable) on the rule-abiding case. Careful mapping from the 
unlinkable scheme in [70] to the secure resource management framework and its security 
analysis are needed in the future research.  
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IV. DIVISIBILITY MANAGEMENT 
 
Divisibility refers to the ability for stakeholders to divide the assets into portions 
to render services. It is at the center of investigation for dispensing of electronic credits 
in E-cash. It is also the main focus on optimal allocation of digital resources. However, 
there is no discussion on the relationship between the two types of designs in literatures. 
In this section, we will focus on the divisibility management of system resources and 
user credits. In E-cash, an N-divisible token [38] allows a service consumer to engage 
several transactions anonymously using the same token until the total spending amount 
reaches the quota limit N. When using the N-divisible token to access computing 
resources, the tracking scheme for spending records should be compatible with the 
resource allocation protocols so that both the performance goals and the security goals 
can be harmonized.   
Existing N-divisible tokens are either coupon-based or tree-based. In the coupon-
based schemes [37, 39, 41, 45, 71], each credential produced by the token represents one 
unit of spent assets. The spending patterns are simply monitored by counting the number 
of credentials produced from the token. In a more sophisticated approach, a binary tree is 
used to keep track of spending patterns [2, 38, 40, 42], where a node located at the level i 
denotes 1/2i units of the total asset. In the second part of [2], Eng-Okamoto developed a 
general divisibility model (GDM) which can transform the non-divisible token into its N-
divisible counterpart for a large class of E-cash schemes [36,50-52] based on the general 
disposable authentication (GDA) model  [2]. The work reported in this section does not 
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consider the first part of [2], which is a specific disposable authentication scheme based 
on Schnorr’s identification [52]. It also does not consider the scheme presented in [49], 
which is a specific scheme prior to its development for divisibility.  
In this section, we investigate how to design the hypercube based N-divisible 
token for computing resource allocations based on the GDA framework. Instead of using 
a tree as in [2], hypercube is chosen in this study because it is a widely used data 
structure for allocation of computing resources [3, 72, 73]. Being a superset of various 
data structures such as tree, mesh, and star, it spots some interesting insights on the 
interplay between the cryptographic constructs and the resource allocation rules. First, 
hypercube is a more flexible data structure that expands the possible divisibility 
configurations from O(2n+1) to O(3n), comparing with the binary tree, where n is the bit 
length to represent an atomic unit of assets. However, the expanded divisibility 
configurations also create the new type of shared-node double-transfer violation pattern, 
in addition to the traditional same-node and route-node violation patterns. Tracking of 
the new violation type makes the analysis much more complicated than the tree based 
solutions. Therefore, we devised a hypercube dependency graph to track the spending 
patterns using both the top-down and bottom-up dependency analysis techniques. In 
contrast, only the latter approach is used for the tree based solution in GDA. From the 
analysis, we found that unrestricted sub-cube allocation schemes might cause leaking of 
identity, even without double-transfer offenses, unless a costly solution is considered. 
Such a leaking of identity information is called anonymity hazard. We found that 
anonymity hazard can be detected and avoided at small extra cost of fragmentation (< 
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2% in our simulation), without any restrictions on the sub-cube allocation schemes. 
Furthermore, two commonly used sub-cube allocation schemes are found to be immune 
(0%) from anonymity hazard because of their more restrictive allocation rules. 
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Section A explains the details of 
the hypercube-based divisibility management framework. Section B analyzes the 
cryptographic constraints needed to assure the AAA requirements. Section C compares 
two cryptographic constructs to demonstrate the tradeoffs between security strength and 
performance cost when different sub-cube allocation rules are used. Section D presents 
the simulation results. Section E gives a summary of this section.  
 
A. Hypercube Based Divisibility Management 
 
An n-dimensional hypercube Qn has 2n nodes, and each node is connected to n 
neighbors. Each sub-cube is uniquely represented by an n-bit ternary string 
 
p = p(1) p(2) 
… p(n), where p(i) ∈{0,×,1}, and “×” denotes a “don’t care” bit. The number of don’t care 
bit(s) in p is also the dimension of the sub-cube p, dim(p). The shortest distance between 
sub-cubes p and q can be measured by their hypercube distance:    
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                   (4.1) 
d(p, q) = 0 implies that p and q share some common node(s), and thus, committing both 
p and q will lead to double spending violation on their shared node(s).  
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Definition 4.1: A dependency graph G = (V, E) is a directed graph, on which an edge (p,
 
q) ∈ E if, and only if, dim(p) = dim(q) + 1 and h(p, q) = 1, where p, q ∈ V are vertices of 
G, and h(p, q) is the Hamming distance [74] between p and q over the alphabets {0,×,1}. 
p is the parent of q if (p,
 
q) ∈ E. Similar nomenclatures follow the convention of tree. 
Gn represents the dependency between all permissible sub-cube configurations of 
Qn. To avoid ambiguity in subsequent discussions, we use “node” to describe an atomic 
node in Qn and “vertex” to describe a node in Gn. Fig. 11 depicts the dependency graph 
of Q2, where each vertex represents a sub-cube that can be derived from Q2. A vertex on 
Gn is marked when a corresponding sub-cube is allocated by its corresponding token. A 
double spending violation occurs if any leaf vertex is allocated twice in two sub-cube 
allocations. 
)dim( pi = inin C −2
××
0× ×0 ×1 1×
00 01 10 11
 
Fig. 11: Dependency graph of a 2-dimensional hypercube, G2. 
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Note that the shadowed area highlights a binary tree embedded into G2, implying 
that hypercube based N-divisible token is required to handle more complicated security 
conditions than its tree based counterpart. From the example in Fig. 11, it shows that 
three types of double spending violations, same-node violation, route-node violation, and 
shared-node violation, can occur to the hypercube based system. A same-node violation 
occurs if a vertex is spent twice. A route-node violation occurs if both a vertex and its 
ancestor/descendant vertex are spent. A shared-node violation occurs when two vertices, 
with no ancestor-descendant relationship but sharing one or more leaf vertices, are spent. 
The same-node and route-node violations were studied in tree based schemes but shared-
node violation is a new type of violation identified in this work to be addressed.  
Now, we outline some basic issues in resource allocations. Minimizing sub-cube 
fragmentation and locating the largest set of useable sub-cubes is the focus of many sub-
cube allocation schemes. Compact representations of Boolean expressions are important 
to achieve performance goals but it may cause unintended double spending. For instance 
(0×, ×0) represents three nodes (00, 01, 10) and this is considered a legal allocation when 
they are allocated to one user. Nevertheless, spending both (0×) and (×0) terms in E-cash 
constitutes a double spending offense because node (00) is involved in two transactions. 
No double spending occurs if the set of nodes are allocated using one of the following 
three Boolean expressions: (0×, 10), (×0, 01), or (00, 01, 10), where redundant Boolean 
terms in sub-cubes are eliminated to prevent incorrect marking of the double spending 
patterns. Using node-by-node expression can avoid the anonymity protection issues but 
it requires the highest computation overhead, and so not considered further.  
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  Following the GDA framework, we design the hypercube based divisible tokens, 
and derive the conditions to satisfy the AAA security constraints. Comparing with tree 
based solutions, applying the hypercube to the GDA framework requires more advanced 
analysis techniques because we need to track the new shared-node violation type also. 
Shared-node violation can occur in data structure whose dependency graph contains a 
multiple-child and multiple-parent structure. This situation is even more complicated for 
hypercube because of its highly connected constructs. For the DSI subsystem to identify 
offenders of all types of double spending violations, more information that can guarantee 
deciphering of the principal’s identity under such conditions needs to be included in the 
credentials. However, doing so may lead to anonymity hazard which is situation when 
the principal’s identity
 
can be deciphered from multiple instances of sub-cube allocations 
even when no double spending occurs. An example will be given in Table 10. 
Granted one could develop more sophisticated mathematical systems to eliminate 
anonymity hazards but a much more practical solution approach is based on the sub-cube 
allocation schemes because anonymity hazards can be recognized via simple rules. To 
gain a more realistic understanding for such a tradeoff analysis, three sub-cube allocation 
schemes, random code (RC), binary code (BC), and binary reflected gray code (BRGC) 
[3] are analyzed and simulated in this study. We will show that anonymity hazards 
appear in the rarely used RC but not to the widely adopted sub-cube allocation schemes, 
BC and BRGC. 
In RC, there is no restriction on which available sub-cube to use for the sub-cube 
request. In BC and BRGC, the hypercube topology is reduced to a linear list based on 
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the binary code and binary gray code order, respectively (see an example in Table 7). A 
sub-cube request is matched with the first sub-cube configuration on the list in a linear 
search order. In either case, to search for an available sub-cube Qk is equivalent to find 2k 
consecutive free nodes from node i to node (i + 2k - 1) in their corresponding allocation 
list. Their main difference is that, in BC, i needs to be a multiple of 2k, while in BRGC, i 
only needs to be a multiple of 2k-1. For details of BC and BRGC, please refer to [3][3].  
BC, BRGC, or other similar non-exhaustive sub-cube allocation schemes would 
utilize a fraction of available sub-cubes as the example depicted in Fig. 12a and Fig. 12b, 
where only highlighted vertices can be used in BC and BRGC, respectively. As shown in 
Fig. 12a, the vertices that can be used in BC are the vertices that can be used in the tree-
based schemes. As shown in Fig. 12b, BRGC has more spending patterns than BC.  
 
Table 7: Allocation list for Q3 in BC and BRGC schemes. 
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
BC 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 
BRGC 000 001 011 010 110 111 101 100 
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Fig. 12: Usable vertices under (a) BC scheme (b) BRGC scheme. 
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1. System overview 
 
The hypercube based divisibility management framework is depicted in Fig. 13, 
which is identical to the resource management framework depicted in Fig. 4. We repeat 
the figure here to highlight details related to divisibility management only. For other 
details, please refer to section II and section III.  
 
 
 
Fig. 13: System architecture for hypercube-based resource management. 
 
 In each transfer, the credential produced by the service consumers indicates the 
ownership of a sub-cube p, where p is the relative address to be interpreted in a series of 
credentials called cascaded credential. For the example in Fig. 13, 0×10 received by U’1 
comprises of three parts: (i) resource owner’s signature on p1 = 0××× from the allocation 
between the resource owner and U0, (ii) credential marked p2 = ×10 from the transfer of 
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U0 and U1’, and (iii) credential marked p3 = × from the consumption between U1’ and the 
resource owner. To keep track of spending patterns, the service consumer needs to select 
certain data derived from the token to be exposed in the credential. The selection of data 
is based on a dependency graph. Each vertex in the dependency graph is associated with 
three data: secret share (E, Y), delegation key r, and verification key X. The definitions 
and notations of these data follow the GDA model as described in Table 1 in section III. 
We repeat the table here in Table 8 for convenience of discussions.  
 
 Table 8: General disposable authentication (GDA). 
AAA Requirements Information Needed Remarks 
verify m = f(x) VU1: X, (E,
 
Y) X = F(x, r) = F’(m, r),  
Y = D(m, r, x, E), and  
m = f(x) iff G(m, X, E, Y) = “yes” 
decipher x DU1: (E, Y), r r = symmetric key to 
encrypt/decrypt x  
 DU2: (E,
 
Y), (E’,
 
Y’) (2, k) secret shares created by (x, r) 
Keep x secret Neither DU1 nor DU2 
available 
r = symmetric key to 
encrypt/decrypt x  
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Using the three types of data associated with the dependency graph, we proposed 
a key dependency map (KDM) to keep track of the correlation of the randomized key 
pairs between different vertices. When the sub-cube Qx is transferred, a set of vertices 
will be selected to have their secret shares or keys released in the credential. The set 
includes the vertex which represents Qx, and other vertices for sub-cubes, say Qy, that is 
subject to the double spending offenses. This way, if Qy is indeed spent in the future, 
DSI can identify the offending patterns. The constraints to select the secret shares and 
keys can be derived in a top-down or bottom-up fashion of the KDM, as it will become 
clear in section B. 
 
2. Hypercube based token and credential 
 
Following the GDA framework, the token is of the following format:  
TK = (m, x),                                                     (4.2) 
Through the blind signature scheme [9], the CA is not able to trace the identity of 
the consumer by associating m or x with the withdrawal records. The information carried 
by a token TK and the hypercube dependency graph (that contains the spending patterns) 
should be integrated into the credential CT to enforce DSI, while protecting anonymity 
of the token owner. Following the high level constructs of GDA, the format of credential 
produced by hypercube based divisible tokens, in the transfer of a sub-cube p, is   
CT = (p, m, DK(u(p)), VK(v(p)), VK(L), SS(s(p))).                  (4.3) 
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DK(V) denotes the outputs produced from the publicly known function DK which 
takes a set of vertices V in G as inputs and produces the delegation keys of V as outputs. 
Similarly VK(V) and SS(V) denote the outputs from the publicly known functions VK and 
SS, respectively, which produce the verification keys and secret shares of V as outputs. 
DK(V), VK(V), and SS(V) are collectively called the DVS values. As it will become clear, 
when p is used in a transfer, other sub-cubes also need to be considered in the generation 
of DVS values. How to control the generations and exposures of DVS values to enforce 
DSI and protect the anonymity of rule-abiding users is the focal issue in the hypercube 
based divisibility management designs. Depending on the sub-cube usage patterns, some 
DVS values need to be put as a part of the credential while others should be kept by the 
token owner to avoid compromising the anonymity.  
Exposure of DVS values is controlled by the constructs of u(p), v(p), s(p), and L 
in (4.2), and their interdependency relationships. u(p), v(p), and s(p), collectively called 
exposure functions, are publicly known functions that produce a set of vertices according 
to the input vertex p. Selected prior to a transaction, L is a set of reference vertices to be 
used for integrity check of credentials. Detailed constructs of the exposure functions and 
L are given in section 3. In subsequent discussions, we will use the term “directly 
exposed” to describe the keys included in the credentials, that is, DK(u(p)), VK(v(p)) and 
VK(L) in (4.3), without using KDM.  We will use the term “indirectly exposed” to 
describe the keys derived from KDM, using the keys directly exposed from the 
credentials as the inputs. 
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Separating notations of vertex sets from their corresponding keys or secret shares 
is convenient for subsequent analysis which requires set intersection, union and negation 
operations. For example, to check whether or not the vertex p has both its delegation key 
and secret share exposed in the credential is equivalent to check whether or not u(p) ∩ 
s(p) ≠ φ. Such a checking cannot be performed by the expression DK(u(p))∩SS(s(p)) ≠ φ 
because the left-hand side and right-hand side of intersection are from different domains. 
Similar to the classical tree based schemes, a hypercube based divisible scheme needs to 
satisfy the following AAA requirements:  
(A1) Authenticity: for any p being used for transfer/consumption, the condition m
 
=
 
f(x) 
can be verified from the credentials of p without unveiling the plaintext of x. 
(A2) Accountability: for any p and q, d(p,
 
q)
 
=
 
0, being used for transfer/consumption, x 
can be deciphered from the credentials of p and q.  
(A3) Anonymity: for all vertices being used for transfer/consumption, if it does not exist 
p and q such that d(p,
 
q) = 0, then x cannot be deciphered from their credentials.  
 Next, we will show how to satisfy the three properties using KDM to create 
details of the proposed divisible token, and proof of its correctness.  
 
3. Key dependency map (KDM) 
 
Recall that each vertex in Gn is associated with a delegation/verification key pair. 
KDM is a function that keeps track of the one-way mapping relationship among the key 
pairs of different vertices. When the sub-cube p is spent (assuming p ∈ s(p)), the keys of 
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the vertices directly exposed in a credential (defined by u(p) and v(p)) will be used as the 
inputs of KDM, so that the delegation keys of some other vertices that are susceptible to 
double spending violation in the future can be indirectly exposed from the KDM outputs. 
In this way, when q is spent later, the secret shares exposed from q (because q ∈ s(q)) in 
the spending of q, together with its delegation key exposed from spending of p, can be 
used to decipher the identity of the double spending offender using DU1. Furthermore, if 
a vertex is spent twice its secret shares will be exposed twice on two different challenge 
messages and the double spending offender can be identified using DU2.  
KDM should avoid exposing the delegation keys of non-susceptible vertices to 
prevent anonymity hazards. In order to supervise susceptible future spending, only some 
susceptible vertices (with respect to p) need to have the delegation keys exposed because 
d(p,
 
q) = 0 ⇔ d(q,
 
p) = 0. It does not matter whether dim(p) > dim(q) or dim(q) > dim(p). 
For example in the top-down KDM, the keys of the vertex p can only be derived from 
the keys of other vertices at dimensions higher than dim(p). We only need to expose the 
delegation keys of susceptible vertices at dimensions lower than dim(p). Similarly, in the 
bottom-up KDM, we only need to expose the delegation keys of susceptible vertices for 
dimensions higher than dim(p). Exposure of keys for susceptible vertices are illustrated 
in the shaded areas in Fig. 14a and Fig. 14b.  
Let p be a vertex in Gn that represents the sub-cube being used to track a transfer 
transaction. H is a publicly known collision-free one-way hash function. The symbol “||” 
is a concatenation operator between two ternary strings.  j = (n - dim(p)) is the number of 
parents of p and (p1, …, pj) are the parents of p listed in ascending order. The ordering of 
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vertices can be computed by substituting “×” by “2”, and order them as ternary numbers. 
For example, the ternary number of “0×1” is 7 = 0⋅32 + 2⋅31 + 1⋅30, and for “×10” is 21 = 
2⋅32 + 1⋅31 + 0⋅30. 
 
p q
   leaf vertices of p
root
q′
q′′
G
       
p q
root
   leaf vertices of p
 

q′
G
 
                         (a)  Bottom-up                                            (b) Top-down 
Fig. 14: Key dependency map (KDM). 
 
The building block for top-down KDM is given by the following equations: 
1
( || ... || || )
jp p p
r H X X p=                                                 (4.4) 
1
( ( , ) || ... || ( , ) || )
jp p
H F m r F m r p′ ′= .                             (4.5) 
 (4.4) follows the tree-based equation, rp = H(Xleft-child(p) || Xright-child(p)), proposed in 
[2], with the following differences: (i) The hypercube-based design takes the verification 
keys from j parents (vs. 2 children) as inputs; (ii) An additional p is appended at the end 
of hash input in (4.4) to distinguish the keys for the children of the root vertex; (iii) Top-
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down approach is used in contrast to the bottom-up approach used in [2]. The bottom-up 
is not efficient for the hypercube based design. The shared-node violation shown in Fig. 
14 demonstrates this point. Let p be the vertex being used for transfer, and q be a vertex 
susceptible to shared-node violation with p, where dim(p) = dim(q). Let q’ and q” be the 
parent and the sibling of q. q’
 
must be susceptible to a shared-node violation, because the 
leaf vertices shared by p and q will also be shared by p and q’, but this is not necessarily 
true for q”. Since we cannot expose the keys for q’
 
(a susceptible vertex) in the bottom-
up KDM without exposing the delegation key for q” (a non-susceptible vertex), it shows 
that the bottom-up approach is unsuitable for the hypercube-based design. 
Next, we consider the top-down KDM approach. Let q’ be the child of q and is 
susceptible to route-node/shared-node violation with p. This implies that all parents of q’ 
are also susceptible, because the leaf vertices shared by p and q’ will also be shared by p 
and the parents of q’. To expose the delegation key of q’ (a susceptible vertex) by a top-
down KDM, we only need to expose the keys for the parents of q’. The parents of q’ are 
also susceptible. Therefore, the top-down KDM is much more efficient than the bottom-
up approach. In the rest of discussions, only the top-down KDM is considered, unless 
explicitly specified otherwise.  
The pseudocode of KDM, based on (4.4) and (4.5), is depicted in Fig. 15, where 
DKin and VKin are respectively the input collections of delegation keys and verification 
keys. Starting from the ith dimension, the routine recursively invokes itself until the leaf 
level is reached (i = 0). The process terminates at Line 05 of the last execution instance. 
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At the end of the execution, KDM produces a collection of delegation and verification 
keys denoted by DKout, VKout, respectively.  
 
 
 
Fig. 15: Pseudocode for key dependency map (KDM). 
 
By controlling which keys are available in (DKin, VKin), the consumer (prover) 
can manage what the other consumer (verifier) can know about the produced keys in the 
transfer. For example, given rroot (randomly generated by the prover prior to the ZKP 
protocol), the set of delegation keys for all vertices in G, denoted by DKG, and the 
corresponding set of verification keys, denoted by VKG, can be produced by KDM, when 
KDM is invoked by (DKin, VKin, i) = ({rroot}, null, n). The consumer will directly expose 
a selected subset of keys from DKG and VKG during transfer. A high level view of the 
above key generation process for G2 is depicted in Fig. 16. The keys of the root are used 
to compute the keys of q1 and q2, and then q5. Generation of keys for the rest of vertices 
can be done in a similar fashion. Despite the similarity between Fig. 16 and the figure in 
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[2], the high connectivity in hypercube dependency graph makes the security analysis on 
A1, A2, and A3 much more complicated than its tree based counterpart.  
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Fig. 16: High level view of key dependency map (KDM). 
 
C. Cryptographic Constraint Analysis  
 
In this section, we analyze the cryptographic constrains for u(p), v(p), s(p) and L, 
so that the exposure of keys and secret shares in the hypercube based credentials could 
satisfy A1, A2, and A3, based on VU1, DU1, DU2, and KDM. The main concern of the 
analysis is to evaluate the conditions for the exposure functions that would be subject to 
anonymity hazards and the techniques to detect and prevent them from occurring in the 
runtime. Recall that u(p), v(p), s(p), and L control the secret shares and keys directly 
exposed from the credential of p in a particular spending instance. For the analysis of 
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indirect exposures from multiple spending instances of p1, p2, …, pj, it is convenient to 
represent them in terms of their KDM input/output. In particular, we denote 
1 1| ,..., | ,...,( , )j jKDM p p KDM p pDK VK                                       (4.6) 
as the final KDM output when it is invoked by the initial input, 
(DK(u(p1) ∪  ∪ u(pj)),   VK(v(p1) ∪∪ v(pj) ∪ L),  n)).           (4.7) 
Note that the KDM input in (4.7) can always start the KDM execution from level 
n, regardless the dimensions of p1,…, pj. This is because that any unmatched parent-child 
relationship that does not contribute to the key generation will be skipped by the loop at 
Line 07 in Fig. 15, and then it will continue the matching by the recursive call of KDM 
at Line 13 until it reaches the leaf level. The KDM output in (4.6) contains all delegation 
and verification keys in Gn that can be derived from the credentials produced from the 
transfers of p1, …, pj. Let DK-1 and VK-1 be the inverse functions of DK and VK. The 
vertex sets for delegation keys and verification keys in (4.6) are respectively denoted by  
uKDM({p1,…, pj}) = DK-1( 1| ,..., jKDM p pDK ),                        (4.8) 
and          
vKDM({p1,…, pj}) = VK-1( 1| ,..., jKDM p pVK ).                         (4.9) 
Similar notations are described as follows: (i) replace the subscript KDM in (4.6), 
(4.8) and (4.9) by KDM\L if L is removed from (4.7); (ii) replace the subscript KDM in 
(4.6) by KDM\L,q if both L and q are removed from (4.7) for q ∈ (u(p1)∪  ∪u(pj)) ∪ 
(v(p1)∪∪v(pj)). Some KDM results related to A1, A2, A3, and the key generation are 
summarized in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Input/output of key dependency map (KDM). 
Key Generation A1 A2 A3 
( , )in inDK VK  ({ }, )rootr null  ( ( ( )), ( ( )))DK u p VK v p  1
1
( ( ( ) ... ( )),
( ( ) ... ( ) ))
j
j
DK u p u p
VK v p v p L
∪ ∪
∪ ∪ ∪
 
( , )out outDK VK  ( , )G GDK VK  \ | \ |( , )KDM L p KDM L pDK VK  1 1| ,..., | ,...,( , )j jKDM p p KDM p pDK VK  
Outputs of 
interest 
,G G GDK VK VK⊆  \ |( ( )) ( ) KDM L pVK p VK L VK= ∩
 
1| ,..., jKDM p pDK  
 
1. Authenticity 
 
 The cryptographic constraints for A1 can be analyzed using the set diagram in 
Fig. 17, which provides an excellent visual aid on the feasibility conditions for different 
constraints to co-exist simultaneously. These conditions are derived from VU1, which 
requires the integrity check on the secret share (E,
 
Y), and its corresponding verification 
key X. Therefore, it requires s(p) to be a non-empty set, so that at least one secret share is 
exposed to prove the condition m = f(x). Moreover, it is required that 
vKDM({p}) ⊇ s(p),                                          (4.10) 
so that every secret share exposed in a credential has the corresponding verification key 
available for the integrity check. The integrity check for verification keys is much more 
complicated than the GDA (in Table II), which only needs to examine one verification 
key. In contrast, we need to check all verification keys in VK(vKDM({p})). 
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L φ≠
( )u p
( )v p
( )s p φ≠
\ ({ })KDM Lu p
( )p G
({ })KDMu p
\ ({ })KDM Lv p
({ })KDMv p
 
Fig. 17: Cryptographic constraints for authenticity (A1). 
 
For simplicity, here we first assume that VK(L) is authentic and we will explain 
how to assure the authenticity shortly. To enable integrity check of VK(vKDM({p})) based 
on VK(L), L needs to satisfy two constraints: 
\( ) ({ })KDM Lp L v p φ= ∩ ≠ ,                                   (4.11) 
and 
\ ,( ) ({ }), ( ) ( )KDM L qp L v p q u p v p⊃ ∩ ∀ ∈ ∪ ,                   (4.12) 
(4.11) assures that some verification keys in VK(L) are compared against those 
indirectly exposed by the KDM input (DK(u(p)),
 
VK(v(p)), n). Since KDM is constructed 
by one-way collision-free hash function, any forgery to its inputs DK(u(p)) and VK(v(p)) 
will lead to mismatched outputs for comparisons. 
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 Moreover, (4.12) guarantees that no key in DK(u(p))
 
and VK(v(p)) is redundant 
for comparisons. Otherwise, if removal of vertex q
 
∈
 
u(p)
 
∪
 
v(p) can still give the same 
result as in (4.11), it implies that one might fail to validate the key of q. Knowing that L 
is independent of p, VK(L) should be determined before sub-cube spending  and remain 
unchanged. Otherwise, if a consumer can use two different L’s, then he will be able to 
use different r’s to produce secret shares in two spending instances of p. However, DU2 
requires both secret shares to be produced by the same (x, r) pair so that x can be 
deciphered on DSI. Therefore, the integrity check of VK(L) is to make sure that the same 
collection of keys is used in different spending instances. To do this, two approaches 
have been addressed in TZKP described in section III: (i) VK(L) has to be signed by the 
CA when the token is withdrawn, and the signature is included as part of m in the token 
T. (ii) VK(L) has to be included as part of the challenge E in the previous ZKP instance 
for receiving payment. For further details and comparisons of these two approaches, 
please refer to section III.  
 
2. Accountability 
 
 The cryptographic constraints for A2 and A3 are depicted in the set diagram of 
Fig. 18. Different from the constraints for A1, this time we ought to manage the secret 
shares and the keys for all combinations among 3n vertices in Gn. Such a management 
scheme needs to keep track of all secret shares and keys exposed on the credential and 
indirectly exposed by the KDM.  
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Fig. 18: Cryptographic constraints for anonymity and accountability (A2, A3). 
 
Consider two vertices p and p’ that were involved in double spending violations, 
i.e., d(p, p’) = 0. DU1 and DU2 dictate that one of the following constraints holds: 
DU1: ({ , }) ( ( ) ( ))KDMu p p s p s p φ′ ′∩ ∪ ≠ ,                       (4.13) 
or       
DU2 : ( ) ( )s p s p φ′∩ ≠ .                                                   (4.14) 
By (4.13) it implies that there exists at least one vertex whose delegation key is 
indirectly exposed by KDM when p and p’ are spent. If its secret share is exposed the 
identity of the double spending offender will be deciphered based on DU1. By (4.14) it 
implies that at least one vertex q ∈ s(p)
 
∩
 
s(p’) has its secret share exposed twice when 
both p and p’ are spent. As discussed in A1, the secret share of q are guaranteed to be 
produced by the same delegation key so A2 is assured based on DU2.  
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3. Anonymity 
 
The cryptographic constraints for A3, which are complements of (4.13) and 
(4.14) are given by: 
DU1: 1 1({ ,..., }) ( )
t
KDM t jj
u p p s p φ
=
 
∩ ∪ = 	

 
,                      (4.15) 
and  
DU2 : 
1
( )
t
jj
s p φ
=
∩ = ,                                                         (4.16) 
where p1, …, pt are vertices without double spending violations. (4.15) and (4.16) can be 
interpreted by using counter arguments of (4.13) and (4.14). 
 
C. Cryptographic Constructs and Sub-cube Allocation Schemes 
 
Constructs of the exposure functions, (u(p), v(p), s(p)), and L determine the AAA 
properties. When they are used with sub-cube allocation schemes together, with the 
performance overheads taken into consideration, we found that there exists an interesting 
and important tradeoff between the security strength and performance cost. To examine 
the balance between these factors, we propose two schemes for exposure functions and 
L, in conjunction with their sub-cube allocation rules.  
An important tradeoff issue is noted here for the design of hypercube based N-
divisible token. The first option (scheme I) is not using DU1 to track double spending 
offenses, but this leads to high computation costs due to secret share generation and 
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verification for DU2. The second option (scheme II) is using DU1, but with possible 
anonymity hazards because exhaustive combinations of vertices {p1, p2, …, pt} in (4.21) 
are not tracked. As such, a simple checking routine needs to be added to the sub-cube 
allocation scheme to prevent their occurrences. Since simulation results show that sub-
cube fragmentation related to anonymity hazards is less than 2%, it is highly effective to 
use sub-cube allocation rules to avoid anonymity hazards, rather than eliminating 
anonymity hazards unconditionally.  
 
1. Scheme I 
 
The exposure functions and L in Scheme I are defined as follows: 
s(p) = {leaf vertices of p},                                    (4.17) 
v(p) = {leaf vertices of p},                                    (4.18)  
u(p) = φ,                                                                (4.19)  
L = {all leaf vertices in G}.                                  (4.20) 
It is relatively straightforward to see that (4.17) – (4.20) satisfy all constraints in (4.10) – 
(4.16) but the number of secret shares that need to be exposed is equal to the number of 
nodes being spent. Note that generation and verification of secret shares have the highest 
computing costs in transfer protocol (assuming the computing H(⋅) is fast), making it a 
high computing overhead design.  
Through the following arguments we assert that it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to find a more efficient alternative to Scheme I that can guarantee A3. First, we note that 
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it is relatively easy to satisfy A1 and A2 because they only consider one or two vertices 
each time. The analysis of A3 is complex because uKDM(⋅) in (4.15) is non-linear:  
1 1
({ ,.., }) ({ })
t
KDM t KDM jj
u p p u p
=
⊇ ∪ .                         (4.21) 
The inequality in (4.21) is caused by the multi-parent, multi-child structure in Gn. 
It implies that delegation keys produced individually from p1,…, pt, might miss some 
keys from those produced jointly. Losing track of these delegation keys will lead to 
anonymity hazard based on DU1. We illustrate this by Fig. 18, from which q has two 
parents, q1∈uKDM({p}) and 1q′ ∈uKDM({p’}), where d(p, p’) ≠ 0, d(q, p) ≠ 0 and d(q, p’) ≠ 
0. Spending p and p’
 
should not expose the delegation key of q, because q is not a 
susceptible vertex. q
 
∉
 
uKDM({p}) because 1 ({ })KDMq v p′ ∉ . Similarly, q ∉ uKDM({p’}) 
because q1 ∉ vKDM({p’}). However, we have q ∈ uKDM({p, p’}) because both q1 and 1q′  
are available when credentials of p and p’ are jointly considered. The delegation key of q 
(exposed by credentials of p and p’) and its secret share (exposed by credential of q) 
create an anonymity hazard based on DU1. This kind of anonymity hazard does not 
occur to Scheme I, because the equality in (4.21) is assured by (4.19). On the other hand, 
Scheme I can only use DU2 for DSI, which requires a large number of secret shares to 
maintain A1 and A2.  
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2. Scheme II 
 
 The exposure functions and L in scheme II are defined as follows: 
s(p) = {p},                                                         (4.22) 
v(p) = {p},                                                         (4.23) 
u(p) = {∀q | d(p, q) = 0, p ≠ q, dim(q) = dim(p)},                        (4.24) 
L = {all leaf vertices in G}.                                          (4.25) 
In contrast to scheme I, this scheme reduces the computation cost in the transfer 
protocol by selecting (4.22) as a minimal set that contains p alone. By using the minimal 
set of secret shares, we can guarantee the identification of same-node DSI violator, based 
on DU2, and the rest of analysis on distinct vertices will focus on DU1 and its 
complement.  
By (4.22) – (4.23) and the constructs of KDM, we have ({ }) ( )KDMv p v p⊇ = s(p), 
and hence, (4.10) is satisfied. To show that (4.22) – (4.25) also satisfy (4.11) – (4.12) for 
A1 and (4.13) – (4.14) for A2, we need to study their KDM outputs. (4.23) represents all 
vertices susceptible to shared-node violation with p at dimension dim(p). Together with 
(4.23), which contains p only, u(p)∪v(p) represents all vertices susceptible to shared-
node and same-node violations at dim(p). We show that  
vKDM\L({p}) = {∀q | d(p, q) = 0, dim(q) ≤  dim(p)},              (4.26) 
by considering the following vertex marking scheme:  
(i) Initially all vertices unmarked;  
(ii) Mark all descendants of p;  
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(iii) Mark the unmarked parent(s) of the marked vertices if the unmarked parents are at 
the dimension not greater than dim(p);  
(iv) Repeat step (iii) until no more vertices can be marked.  
The resulting collection of marked vertices are susceptible vertices at dimensions 
lower than or equal to dim(p) as described in (4.26) because they share some leaf 
vertices of p. Those marked vertices at dim(p), i.e., u(p)∪v(p) can use their keys to 
compute the keys of other marked vertices by KDM, because the ancestor searching 
process in step (iii) and (iv) guarantees that any marked vertex at dimension lower than 
dim(p) has the delegation/verification keys of its parents available from other marked 
vertices to produce its keys using (4.4). Fig. 19 depicts how the vertex marking scheme 
works in G3.  
Suppose p
 
=
 
0×× is a vertex used for transfer. To evaluate vKDM({0××}), we first 
mark all descendants of 0××, i.e., {00×,
 
01×, 0×0,
 
0×1,
 
000,
 
001,
 
010,
 
011}, and then we 
mark all unmarked ancestors of these vertices at levels ≤ dim(p), i.e., {×00,
 
×01,
 
×10,
 
×11,
 
0××,
 
×0×,
 
×1×,
 
××0,
 
××1}. We can see that u(p)
 
=
 
{×0×,
 
×1×,
 
××0,
 
××1} and v(p)
 
=
 
{0××} have formed all the dependencies that are required to compute the verification 
keys of all marked vertices. The marked nodes are susceptible to double spending with p 
at dimensions ≤  dim(p). Given vKDM\L(⋅) defined in (4.26), (4.11) holds because each 
vertex p has at least one leaf vertex q at some dimension not greater than dim(p), that is 
susceptible to double spending (equal dimension if p = q.) Furthermore, (4.12) also holds 
because removing any vertex q from u(p)∪v(p) will prohibit the key computation of 
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some leaf vertex shared by p and q. Since (4.22)-(4.25) satisfy (4.10)-(4.12), Scheme II 
satisfies all cryptographic constraints for A1. 
 
00×00× 0 1× 01×01× 10×1 0×10× 11×11× 1 1×0 0×
001 010 011 100 101 110 111000
0×× 0× × 0×× 1× ×1×× 1××
×××( )s p∈ ( )v p∈ ( )u p∈
({ })KDMu p∈ ({ })KDMv p∈ ( )p∈
3G
 
Fig. 19: Vertex marking scheme for susceptible vertices with respect to p = 0××. 
 
To show that (4.22)-(4.25) also satisfy the crypto constraints for A2, we need to 
show that they satisfy either (4.13) or (4.14) for any vertices p and p’, where d(p,
 
p’) = 0. 
For the case of p = p’, it is straightforward that (4.14) is satisfied. For p ≠ p’, dim(p) ≥ 
dim(p’), we first show that  
uKDM({p}) = {∀q | d(p, q) = 0, p ≠ q, dim(q) ≤  dim(p)}.            (4.27)  
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(4.26) and (4.27) are depicted in Fig. 19, by the highlighted vertices, and the set of 
vertices with a dot marked inside, respectively. (4.26) and (4.27) are almost identical 
except that {p} is excluded from (4.27). In (4.27), the vertices at dimension dim(p) are 
contributed by (4.24), while those at dimensions lower than dim(p) are justified by the 
vertex marking scheme we described before. Based on (4.27), we have  
uKDM({p}) ∩ s(p’) = p’.                                         (4.28) 
In addition, based on (4.21) or uKDM({p, p’}) ⊇ uKDM({p}), we conclude that (4.13) is 
satisfied for A2. 
Table 10 depicts a spending configuration that can lead to anonymity hazards in 
G3, where p1 = 1×0, p2 = 01×, p3 = ×01, and p4 = 000 are four vertices for transfers3. 
Even though d(pi, pj) ≠ 0 for any distinct pair, by using their credentials, the delegation 
key of 000 can be produced by (4.4), i.e., r000 = H(X00×|| X0×0|| X×00|| 000), because ×00 ∈ 
u(p1), 0×0 ∈ u(p2) and 00× ∈ u(p3). Using r000, and the secret share of 000 exposed from 
s(p4) = {000}, the identity of this rule-abiding consumer can be deciphered by DU1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 We will show in Appendix that the minimum number of vertices to cause anonymity hazard in 
Scheme II is four. 
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Table 10: Anonymity hazard scenario in G3.  
Spent vertex Exposure functions 
p1 = 1×0 u(p1) = {10×, 11×, ×00, ×10} 
p2 = 01× u(p2) = {×10, ×11, 0×0, 0×1} 
p3 = ×01 u(p3) = {0×1, 1×1, 00×, 10×} 
p4 = 000 s(p4) = {000} 
  
Scheme II is more efficient than Scheme I. However, it does not guarantee A3 
unconditionally. It is designed to work with a sub-cube allocation scheme to detect and 
avoid anonymity hazards before a sub-cube is spent or allocated. We propose a simple 
anonymity hazard test (AHT) algorithm to test whether or not a vertex p of the requested 
sub-cube size is subject to anonymity hazard with respect to previously spent vertices, so 
that only hazard-free sub-cubes will be spent and allocated. When all available vertices 
at the requested sub-cube size are subject to anonymity hazard, the request will need to 
be divided into smaller requests, each of which will need to be served separately. This 
type of fragmentation condition is caused by anonymity hazard, as the example depicted 
in Table 11.  
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Table 11: Fragmentation scenario when Q1 is requested.  
Spent vertex Exposure functions 
p1 = 1×0 u(p1) = {10×, 11×, ×00, ×10} 
p2 = 01× u(p2) = {×10, ×11, 0×0, 0×1} 
p3 = ×01 u(p3) = {0×1, 1×1, 00×, 10×} 
p4 = 111 s(p4) = {111} 
 
 
In this example, p1 = 1×0, p2 = 01×, p3 = 000, and p4 = 111 are spent. If the next 
sub-cube requested is a Q1 then the only available vertex of this size is ×01. As shown in 
Table 10, an anonymity hazard will result from spending of ×01, after p1, p2, and p3 have 
been spent but the anonymity hazard  is eliminated when ×01 is divided into two smaller 
sub-units {001,
 
101} for spending. The sub-cube fragmentation increases computation 
and communication overheads. Fortunately, simulation results show that fragmentation 
caused by anonymity hazard in Scheme II is negligible even when arbitrary sub-cube 
allocation scheme is considered. The simulation further shows that no anonymity hazard 
is detected when Scheme II is integrated with two popular sub-cube allocation schemes, 
BC or BRGC.  
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D. Experimental Results 
 
The objective of this simulation is to evaluate the occurrences of anonymity 
hazards and their fragmentation effects for BC, BRGC and RC. Before giving details of 
the simulation program, we first explain the AHT algorithm as shown in Fig. 20.  
In AHT, each vertex in G is represented by one of the four colors: white, black, 
gray and red. Each vertex is initialized to white before any spending instance. A black 
vertex implies that its verification key has been exposed from past spending instance(s). 
A red vertex implies that both its verification key and the secret share of this vertex have 
been exposed from past spending instance(s). A gray vertex implies that its delegation 
and verification key are not exposed from past spending instance(s), but will be exposed 
if the current spending instance succeeds.  
 
Fig. 20: Pseudocode of anonymity hazard test (AHT). 
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The algorithm returns TRUE when an anonymity hazard is detected at Lines 03 
and 14 for the pending sub-cube spending. Line 03 is the case when the verification keys 
or the delegation keys of all parents of p have been exposed from the past spending 
instance(s). Thus, all parents are not white in Line 02. By (4.4) and (4.5), the delegation 
key of p can be derived from these delegation keys or verification keys. Furthermore, by 
(4.22), the secret share of p will be exposed if the current spending instance succeeds. If 
both the delegation key and secret share of p are available, the identity can be deciphered 
based on DU1. Line 14 handles the case when the algorithm attempts to turn a red vertex 
q to gray. The algorithm attempts to change a vertex q to gray color when all parents of q 
are not white (Line 08), which means the delegation key of q can be derived by (4.22) if 
p is spent. Since q is originally red, its secret share was exposed from previous spending 
instance. Given both the delegation key and the secret share of q available, the identity 
can be deciphered based on DU1.  
In Line 05, the originally uncolored vertices in u(p)∪v(p) are colored in gray by 
definitions of u(p) and v(p), but colored vertices remain unchanged so that only gray 
vertices need to be rolled back to the white color if p is found to be subject to anonymity 
hazard (Line 14.)  The loop from Lines 07 to 17 is to update the colors of vertices due to 
Line 05. For the top-down KDM analysis, Line 05 computes the delegation keys and 
verification keys for vertices at the dimensions lower than dim(p) in this loop. Let q be a 
susceptible vertex in the loop. Line 08 checks if all parents of q are not white; and if they 
are all not white, it means that the delegation key of q can be derived by (4.22) if p is 
indeed spent. As a result, q needs to be marked gray if it is not colored before (Lines 09 
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to 10). However, if q has been marked in red (Line 11), then anonymity hazard will 
occur if p is spent. p needs to roll back to its original color (black or white) and all 
vertices colored in gray during this test need to be rolled back to the white color (Lines 
12 and 13) and an anonymity hazard condition needs to be reported (Line 14). If no 
anonymity hazard is found after checking all q in the loop, then p can be spent without 
causing any problem. Before returning FALSE (Line 20), p and all vertices colored in 
gray need to mark their colors red and black (Lines 18 and 19), respectively. 
The pseudo code of the simulation is given in Fig. 21 to measure occurrences of 
anonymity hazard, and their fragmentation effects. The program starts by initializing all 
leaf vertices in Gn as “not spent” in Line 01. Then it keeps generating sub-cube requests 
of different sizes for spending, and finally it terminates at Line 25 when all leaf vertices 
are marked “spent”.   
Lines 02 to 03 randomly and uniformly generate a vertex p_tmp = 0, 1, …,3n-1. 
The ternary representation of p_tmp is used to determine i = dim(p_tmp). In this way, the 
probability in producing requests of extremely large/small sub-cubes is minimized. For 
example, in G3 the probability to request the entire hypercube (the root vertex) is 1/33 = 
1/27, while that for a sub-cube at dimensions 2, 1, and 0 from G3 are 6/27, 12/27, and 
8/27, respectively.  A request can be served only if one sub-cube of the same size can be 
found from the unspent sub-cube pool based on the sub-cube allocation rule, such as BC, 
BRGC, RC, and no anonymity hazard is detected. Otherwise, the request is discarded.  
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Fig. 21: Pseudocode of the simulation program for fragmentation. 
 
The simulation results for G4 to G10 are depicted in Fig. 22 and Fig. 23 based on 
the average results of 1,000 runs of simulation instances. The anonymity hazard ratio is 
measured by the number of AHT executions which return TRUE to the total number of 
AHT executions in Line 12. The fragmentation ratio is the proportion of fragmentations 
(caused by anonymity hazards) versus the total number of sub-cube requests in Line 07. 
For RC, the anonymity hazard ratio increases in a linear fashion with the hypercube size 
from G4 to G10. On the other hand, the fragmentation ratio decreases with the hypercube 
size and is consistently lower than 2%. In contrast, anonymity hazard did not occur to 
BC or BRGC in all simulation runs, and thus AHT is not needed for these two schemes.  
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Fig. 22: Anonymity hazard ratio. 
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Fig. 23: Fragmentation ratio (caused by anonymity hazards). 
 
E. Summary 
 
In this section, we investigated the relationship between N-divisible tokens, sub-
cube allocation schemes, and their integration. We demonstrated that a holistic security 
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management system can be created by tailoring the N-divisible token framework of the 
disposable authentication with different sub-cube allocation schemes. We developed the 
analysis techniques to guarantee the AAA properties of hypercube based N-divisible 
tokens. As expected, the most secure solution requires the highest computing cost. As an 
alternative, we also show that one can achieve the same security management goals at 
much lower computing costs by relaxing the anonymity protection rules and adding an 
anonymity hazard checking routine before the sub-cube can be allocated. The anonymity 
hazard checking routine is simple and reliable. Furthermore, simulation results show that 
existing sub-cube allocation schemes binary code and binary gray code are immune from 
anonymity hazards because of their restrictive allocation rules. Our study suggests that 
with proper adjustment to both the N-divisible tokens and the resource allocation rules, 
highly secure and efficient computing resource management schemes can be developed 
based on one integrated framework. 
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V. PRIVACY PRESERVING SERVICE ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE (SOA) 
 
Service oriented architecture (SOA) is a software paradigm which links business 
and computation resources on demand to achieve desired results for service consumers. 
It promotes the reuse of computer resources at macro level (services) rather than micro 
level (objects). The abstraction and reusability on the loosely coupled and interoperable 
services help business respond timely and cost-effectively to changing market conditions 
[75]. In this section, we will introduce a privacy preserving SOA framework to support 
service reservation in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network.  
Service reservation is useful for SOA to allow service providers more predictable 
workload. It also allows service consumers to be more certain on availability of services. 
For example, a service consumer wants to guarantee that all required service components 
are reserved before the service components are used to construct new composite, higher-
level services. Nevertheless, service reservation may also cause a waste of resources if a 
service consumer does not need the reserved services anymore. For example, the service 
consumer reserves two similar services but only uses the better one based on the current 
market condition. Therefore, a more advanced design should allow the service consumer 
to transfer its service reservation to another service consumer, so that any consumer who 
can present a valid service reservation can redeem the services from the service provider.  
Clearly, the E-cash based resource management framework proposed in previous 
sections paves a solid foundation for the reservation and transfer operations. However, 
the E-cash paradigm has a missing link in service discovery to get service providers and 
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service consumers know each other before they can start the service transactions. In this 
section, we aim to bridge the gap by studying the service discovery in a P2P network.  
Service discovery in SOA is typically achieved by service brokering [76], where 
the service providers and service consumers need to register to the service broker(s), and 
then the service broker serves as a directory to introduce the service consumer to service 
provider, and then the service consumer and service provider can communicate directly 
for transactions. Existing service discovery protocols such as UDDI [77], SSDS [78], 
and Splendor [79], provide directory service through a collection of dedicated trusted 
servers which locations are well-known. On the other hand, service discovery in P2P 
networks require every peer node in the network to be the directory of other peer nodes, 
and their locations may not be known in advance. Without using well-known trusted 
servers, peer nodes are reluctant to release their sensitive information, such as work 
requests, service capabilities, terms, and availability schedules. Leakage of the inquiry or 
service offering may trigger rumors or market volatility. However, without releasing 
enough information, they can hardly locate potential collaborators for business 
transactions.  
To solve this dilemma, our main idea is to allow users to progressively release 
sensitive information for matching and verification, while not leaking the information to 
unintended recipients upon failure of matching or verification. It is similar to the idea of 
qualification verification which mutually verifies such information as the possessions of 
goods, skills, and finance resources, while blocking speculators from accessing privilege 
information exchanged between users. In particular, we focus on the privacy protection 
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of service contents, group identities, and user identities through the multi-layer Bloom 
filter (MLBF) and secret handshake (SH) protocol. Both cryptographic tools require no 
centralized supervision during regular operations so they are useful for the P2P network. 
In the proposed framework, users are interconnected by CHORD [80]. CHORD 
is a ring-based P2P network that supports efficient posting and inquiries of services with 
distributed hashing tables (DHTs) [81]. Nevertheless, the key space of CHORD is flat so 
it does not inherently support service lookup of structural data such as XML. XML is the 
de facto standard data format in SOA. Numerous works are proposed for the XML-based 
service discovery in CHORD [82, 83] but they require all or part of the XML plaintext to 
be kept in the directory nodes, leaving vulnerability for leaking sensitive information. To 
provide better privacy protection, we hash the service contents by MLBF to generate the 
location information on CHORD. Publications of hashed results protect the exact natures 
of services while still allowing potential service consumers who can specify the related 
service to locate matched service providers. At the same time, contents of inquires from 
consumers are also protected because they are also hashed by MLBF.  
Given that all service contents are published in their hashed forms, MLBF offers 
reasonable protection from outsiders. But it does not protect the participants from insider 
adversary who are determined to make broad surveys or scans of the business activities. 
Furthermore, there is no way for matched participants to make risk-free, fair exchange of 
information, unless they belong to the same group that implies a similar trusted level or 
capabilities. As such, we only use MLBF to distribute the natures of available services. 
After two users are matched, they need to execute an SH protocol to test whether or not 
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they belong to the same group. If they are within the same group, they can execute the 
transaction using the TZKP protocol to perform such functions as service reservations, 
service redemptions, and transfers of reservations. Otherwise, if they belong to different 
groups, the SH protocol guarantees that their group identities cannot be deciphered from 
one another using their authentication messages.  
Different from the original SH protocol [6], our scheme supports reusable tokens 
which allow two users from the same group to authenticate each other without exposing 
their user identities. In contrast, reusing a token in [6] will link authentication messages 
of different transactions to the same user identity. Our protocol does not need to assign a 
set of pseudonyms to the user, while the original SH requires the allocation of one-time 
pseudonyms for each user. Our scheme only requires 2 pairing operations. On the other 
hand, the scheme in [7] uses 6 pairing operations for the similar functions. Experimental 
results show that our scheme takes 65 milliseconds for each SH operation. It provides a 
light-weight authentication solution for screening of unknown users in secure resource 
allocations.  
The rest of this section will be organized as follows. Section A gives a system 
overview. Section B explains the basic operations needed in the system. Section C 
elaborates the protocol details of the system. Section D delivers the experiment results. 
Section E gives a summary of this section. 
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A. System Overview 
 
In this section, we explain the system architecture of our privacy preserving SOA 
framework. The system comprises of three major phases: system initialization, service 
discovery, and service transaction. As shown in Fig. 24, the central authority (CA) only 
participates in the system initialization phase. The peer nodes can operate autonomously 
on the logical ring (CHORD) to look up target nodes in the service discovery phase, and 
then communicate directly (point-to-point) with target nodes in the transaction phase.  
In system initialization, the CA prepares the public-private parameters required 
by the system. After that, the users can register from the CA. During registration, the CA 
assigns a unique user identity and a group identity by issuing some tokens to the user. 
The users will need to use these tokens to authenticate each other as a legitimate service 
provider or service consumer during the service discovery and service transaction phases.  
In service discovery, users search on the CHORD ring for other users who have 
matched groups, service requests, and service descriptions. The user who joined the ring 
can add the MLBF representation of its service descriptions onto the ring. Two types of 
users can add their descriptions. The first type is the service provider who offers services. 
The second type is the service consumer who reserved services and wants to transfer it to 
another consumer. Both types of users want potential consumers to search their service 
descriptions on the ring. The consumer searches the service descriptions by preparing an 
MLBF representation of its service request and looks up on the ring. The lookup returns 
the locations of providers who provide potentially matched services and the locations of 
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consumers who transfer potentially matched service reservations. The consumer contacts 
some of these locations to further match their groups by the SH protocol. The consumer 
proceeds to the service transaction phase if they belong to the same group. 
 
                 
 
Fig. 24: System architecture for reservation based SOA. 
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In service transaction, the matched service providers and consumers in service 
discovery can use the TZKP protocol to take part in three protocols: service reservation, 
reservation transfer, and service redemption. In service reservation, the service provider 
issues a reservation credential (a.k.a. TAA in section III) to the consumer. It grants the 
reservation credential holder the authorization to redeem the said service. In reservation 
transfer, the service consumer can choose to give up the authorization and transfer it to 
another consumer. In service redemption, the service provider offers service to the user 
who can present the reservation credential, no matter who the user is.  
Fig. 24b and Fig. 24c demonstrate an example for service discovery and service 
transaction. Node U5 is a service consumer who reserved some services from the service 
provider. Now, U5 wants to transfer its service reservation to others. It adds the service 
description to the CHORD ring. We assume that the service description is added to the 
node U4 in this example. Another service consumer U2 wants to search for services. It 
prepares a service request and looks up on the CHORD ring. U2 finds that U4 stores a 
potentially matched service description. U4 returns the location of U5 to U2. U2 contacts 
U5 to check whether or not they belong to the same group. If they belong to the same 
group, then they are willing to exchange their service description and service request, to 
check whether or not they are matched. If they are matched, U5 transfers the reservation 
to U2, and removes the service description from U4. Finally, U2 can redeem the service, 
or transfer the reservation to other consumer.  
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B. Basic Operations 
 
The building blocks include CHORD, MLBF, and the SH protocol. CHORD 
facilitates service lookup in a P2P network. MLBF protects the service descriptions and 
requests for service lookups. SH protocol protects group identities of service providers 
and service consumers who take part in the service lookup.  
 
1. P2P network: CHORD 
 
CHORD [80, 81] is a P2P network from which each node is ordered in a logical 
ring modulo 2m. A node can add a key-value pair to another node and lookup the value 
from the node using the key. The lookup protocol of CHORD is efficient, which requires 
O(log n) hops only, where n is the number of nodes on the ring. We denote the location 
of node A on the ring as LCA. The basic operations of CHORD are described as follows: 
LOOKUP: Lookup refers to the mapping from the key to the node location. It maps key 
k to the first node location equals to or follows k. This node is called the successor node 
of k, denoted by successor(k). To speedup the lookup process, it uses a finger table up to 
m entries. The i-th entry at node n stores s = successor(n+2i-1). Node n can skip all nodes 
between its successor and the precedent of s if k is larger than the precedent of s.  
ADD/RETRIEVE/DELETE VALUE: Lookup the node location by the key, and then add 
the value to the node, or retrieve or delete the value from the node.  
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JOIN/LEAVE/FAILURE OF NODE: Every node updates its finger table periodically to 
reflect changes caused by join, leave, or failure of nodes. For join operation, some values 
are migrated to the joined node from its precedent. For leave operation, all values are 
moved from the leaving node to its successor. To handle the simultaneous failures, each 
node keeps a successor list which stores the first r successors. If the immediate successor 
does not respond, the node substitutes it with the second entry in the successor list.  
 
2. Multi-layer Bloom filter (MLBF) 
 
MLBF [84] is originally designed for space-efficient content-based routing in the 
tree-based topology. It is an array of hash functions for heuristic membership testing for 
data in hierarchical structures such as XML. To understand MLBF, we first introduce the 
basic operations for baseline Bloom filter as follows:  
INITIALIZATION: We prepare a vector v with m bits, initially all set to 0, then prepare k 
hash functions, h1, h2, …, hk, each with range 1 to m. m the length of the Bloom filter.  
ADD ELEMENT: To add element a to v, we set v = v ∨ BF(a), where ∨ is the binary OR 
operator, and BF(a) is an m-bit string with its positions, h1(a), h2(a), …, hk(a), set to 1, 
and the rest of bits set to 0.  
MATCH ELEMENT: To match element b with v we check the bits at the positions, h1(b), 
h2(b), …, hk(b), in v. If any of them is 0, then b was not added. Otherwise, we conjecture 
that b was added despite a certain probability that it was not. k and m are selected in such 
a way that the false positive rate is acceptable.  
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MLBF is constructed by multiple baseline Bloom Filters as described as follows: 
INITIALIZATION: We prepare BF0, …, BFj and their vectors v0, …, vj. Then, we prepare 
a vector t with n bits initially all set to 0, where n is the total length of the Bloom filters.  
ADD DOCUMENT: To add an XML document D to t, we add all element names at level 
i of D to vi with BFi, where root level = 1. In addition, we add all element names in D to 
v0 with BF0. We compute MLBF(D) = v0 ||…|| vj, where “||” is the concatenation operator. 
Then we set t = t ∨ MLBF(D) and reset all vi to be 0.  
MATCH REQUEST: To match XPath T = “/a1/…/ap” with t, we compute ui as follows:  
u0 = BF0(a1) ∨…∨ BF0(aj), for ai = an element name.                (5.1) 
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Let t = t1…tn and s = MLBFQ(T) = s1…sn = u0 ||…|| uj, where ti, si ={0,1}. If (t ∧ s) ⊗ s = 
0, i.e., ti = 1 for all si = 1, then T potentially matches some documents added to t, where 
∧ is binary AND operator, and ⊗ is binary XOR operator. Otherwise, this is a mismatch. 
The false positive rate is decided by the BF sizes at each level and natures of D and T.  
 
3. Secret handshake (SH) protocol 
 
Among various group authentication schemes, secret handshake protocol [6, 7, 
85-91] emphasizes on protection of group membership information. In its original form, 
secret handshake protocol allows a group member to verify the membership of another 
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member while non-members cannot determine or impersonate group membership from 
their authentication messages. The authentication does not require supervisions from the 
central authority (CA) but users need to receive some SH tokens from the CA to become 
a member to be able to take part in secret handshakes. The SH token is derived from the 
user identity and a group secret. The group secret is known by the central authority only. 
Secret handshake protocol differs from other group authentication schemes that it does 
not require group public key. It checks whether or not both users can compute a common 
value using their tokens. A common value implies that their tokens are derived from the 
same group secret, and hence, they are from the same group. In contrast, distinct values 
do not expose any information that can link to the group membership of the users. 
The proposed SH protocol is derived from the pairing-based SH protocol in [6]. 
Pairing-based cryptography is based on bilinear maps over groups of large prime order 
[8]. In pairing-based cryptography, “groups” refers to groups in linear algebra which is 
different from groups in SH protocol. G1 denotes an additive cyclic group of prime order 
q. G2 denotes a multiplicative cyclic group of order q. G1 and G2 are selected in such a 
way that the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) [8] is hard in both of them.  
Definition 5.1: A pairing is a bilinear map e: G1 × G1  G2 if, for any P, Q ∈ G1 and 
any a, b ∈ Z*q, we have e(a⋅P, b⋅Q) = e(a⋅P, Q)b = e(P, b⋅Q)a = e(P, Q)a⋅b  and  e(P,Q) = 
e(Q, P) for ∀ P, Q ∈ G1. 
A typical choice of G1 is a set of points on an elliptic curve. G2 is a multiplicative 
cyclic group over integers. Our SH protocol uses Tate parings on supersingular elliptic 
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curves because their computations of bilinear maps are efficient [92], provided that the 
following problem is hard:  
Definition 5.2 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption): Given P, a⋅P, b⋅P, c⋅P 
for random a, b, c ∈ Z*q and P ∈ G1, it is not possible to compute e(P, P)a⋅b⋅c with a non-
negligible probability, i.e., it is hard to compute e(P, P)a⋅b⋅c. 
Our protocol uses two hash functions H1 and H2. H1 maps a string with arbitrary 
length to an element in G1, i.e., a point on a specific elliptic curve. H2 maps a string with 
arbitrary length to a string with fixed length. “||” denotes a string concatenation operator. 
The SH system comprises of a central authority (CA) and a collection of users. 
The CA is responsible for setting up system parameters and issuing tokens for users to 
prove the group membership. The CA sets up pairing parameters (q, G1, G2, e, H1, H2) 
during system initialization. It also prepares a series of group secrets [g1, …, gn] to 
represent different groups. The pairing parameters are published to the users whereas the 
group secrets are known by the CA only. When user A joins group gA, A presents its user 
identity, IDA, to the CA. Then the CA grants the group membership by issuing A a token, 
KA, derived from gA and IDA. KA is the secret for A to prove its group membership to 
other users, without exposing any information which can link to IDA. A cannot forge a 
token to prove a group membership other than gA.  
The group membership knowledge that can be observed from the authentication 
messages is summarized in Table 12. As depicted in the table, A and B can authenticate 
one another anonymously using their tokens if they are from the same group, gA = gB, 
but they do not know the values of gA and gB. If A and B belong to different groups, or 
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any of them belong to no group, they know gA ≠ gB only. A and B obtain no information 
that can link to the values of gA and gB. Other users cannot perceive whether A and B 
belong to the same group or not. In this section, we proposed a reusable SH token so that 
users can use an SH token multiple times in different transactions, without exposing any 
information that can link to the user identity.  
 
Table 12: Secret handshake protocol with reusable tokens.  
 A and B ∈ some group  A or B ∉ any group Users other than A and B 
Succeeds gA = gB Always Fails 
Fails gA ≠ gB 
Uncertain:  
gA = gB ? 
 
Our main idea is to let the user generate a secret random number in every secret 
handshake. The user needs to multiply the random number to an elliptic curve point that 
represents the user identity. The random number minimizes the correlation between the 
authentication messages even though they are produced by reuse of a token. The simple 
construct is more efficient than other reusable schemes with similar functions [6, 89]. 
Our protocol comprises of three phases: INITIALIZATION, JOIN GROUP, and SECRET 
HANDSHAKE, as detailed below: 
INITIALIZATION: The CA determines the pairing parameters (q, G1, G2, e, H1, H2) and 
group secrets [g1,…, gn] given a security parameter 1k, where q is a large prime and gi ∈ 
Z*q. The CA publishes the pairing parameters while keeping the group secrets in private.  
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JOIN GROUP: User A requests the CA to join group gA ∈ [g1,…, gn].  The CA verifies 
A’s user identity, IDA, to decide whether A can join the group. The CA grants the group 
membership to A by issuing a token gA⋅H1(IDA) ∈ G1. The token is a secret of A to prove 
its membership in group gA to another user in the same group. A cannot deduce gA from 
gA⋅H1(IDA) and H1(IDA) assuming that DLP is hard in G1. It is important for preventing 
forgery of tokens.  
SECRET HANDSHAKE: Users A and B use their tokens, KA = gA⋅H1(IDA) and KB = 
gB⋅H1(IDB), to generate authentication messages to one another. A randomly generates 
two non-zero integers, nA1 and sA1. nA1 prevents replay attacks as in [85]. sA1 minimizes 
the correlations of authentication messages produced by the same token. Since using a 
token multiple times will not create messages that can link to the user identity, the token 
is reusable. B also randomly generates two non-zero integers, nB1 and sB1, for the same 
purpose. Detailed interactions of our secret handshake protocol are described as follows: 
(a) A  B: nA1, WA1 = sA1⋅H1(IDA)  
(b) B: Compute VB,A = H2(U B,A || nA1 || nB1 || 0), U B,A = e(WA1, sB1⋅KB) 
(c) B  A: nB1, WB1 = sB1⋅H1(IDB), VB,A 
(d) A: Compute V’B,A = H2(U’B,A || nA1 || nB1 || 0), U’B,A = e(WB1, sA1⋅KA) 
If VB,A = V’B,A, then A knows B belongs to the same group, i.e., gA = gB. Otherwise, B 
belongs to a different group, i.e., gA ≠ gB or B belongs to no group. 
(e) A  B: VA,B = H2(U’B,A || nA1 || nB1 || 1) 
(f) B: Compute V’A,B = H2(U B,A || nA1 || nB1 || 1)  
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If VA,B = V’A,B, B knows that A belongs to the same group. Otherwise, A belongs to a 
different group, i.e., gA ≠ gB or A belongs to no group. 
The protocol succeeds when VB,A = V’B,A and VA,B = V’A,B in steps (d) and (f). Based on 
the BDH assumption, it succeeds if, and only if, gA = gB. Otherwise, if it fails, A and B 
only know gA ≠ gB. Users other than A and B do not know whether gA = gB or not, 
because they cannot compute V’B,A and V’A,B without KA and KB. A sketch of proof for 
VB,A = V’B,A is shown in (5.3). The rest of proof for VA,B = V’A,B can be derived similarly. 
A detailed security analysis of our SH protocol is given in Appendix B. 
VB,A   = H2(UB,A || nA1 || nB1 || 0)  
= H2(e(WA1, sB1⋅KB) || nA1 || nB1 || 0)  
= H2(e(sA1⋅H1(IDA), sB1⋅gB⋅H1(IDB)) || nA1 || nB1 || 0)  
          = H2(e(sA1⋅gB⋅H1(IDA), sB1⋅H1(IDB)) || nA1 || nB1 || 0)  
          = H2(e(sB1⋅H1(IDB), sA1⋅gB⋅H1(IDA)) || nA1 || nB1 || 0)   
          = H2(e(WB1, sA1⋅KA) || nA1 || nB1 || 0)   // if, and only if, gA = gB 
          = H2(U’B,A || nA1 || nB1 || 0)   
= V’B,A          (5.3) 
Our scheme simply adds a multiplication of the random number s to the elliptic 
curve point W on top of the original secret handshake protocol [6]. Our protocol requires 
2 pairing operations in steps (b) and (d), while other reusable schemes [6, 89] require 
additional pairing operations or use a composite construct.  
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C. Protocol Details 
 
 In this section, we present the details of our privacy preserving SOA framework. 
It contains three phases: system initialization, service discovery, and service transaction. 
The protocol details in each phase are explained as follows. 
 
1. System initialization phase 
 
PARAMETER SETUP: The CA prepares the public and private parameters for CHORD, 
MLBF, SH, and TZKP. Then, it publishes the public parameters and the following data: 
(i)  enckey(msg), deckey(msg): symmetric encryption and decryption functions where 
key is a symmetric key and msg is the message to be encrypted or decrypted.  
(ii)  signpri(msg), verpub(msg): signature and verification functions where (pri, pub) is 
the private-public key pair for signing or verifying the message msg.  
(iii)  mask: a t-bit binary string with k ones in it, where t is the total length of MLBF
 
and 2k is the ring size. mask will be used to map the MLBF key to the CHORD 
key as we will discuss shortly. 
REGISTRATION: The user requests the CA to issue a TZKP token and two SH tokens. 
The first SH token contains a system-wise common group secret which indicates that the 
user is a registered user. The second SH token contains a group secret that distinguishes 
different user groups. We use K = SH1(A, B) and K = SH2(A, B) to denote the executions 
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of SH protocol between nodes A and B using the first and the second tokens respectively. 
If the SH protocol fails, K < 0. Otherwise, K is the common secret between A and B.  
 
2. Service discovery phase 
 
ADD SERVICE DESCRIPTION: Users who joined the ring can add service descriptions. 
The first concern is to ensure that the user who added the service description is the only 
one who can remove it. An intuitive approach is to record the LC of the node who adds it 
and check the LC when the node removes it. This approach is good for a static setting 
but not when the nodes are highly dynamic. We will show how to use the common secret 
established by SH protocol to verify this authority even the location is changed.  
The second concern is the mapping of service description, D, to the CHORD key. 
An intuitive approach is to map MLBF(D) as the CHORD key. Nevertheless, MLBF(D) 
typically needs thousands bits to achieve an acceptably low false positive rate, making 
the ring extremely large. Although the lookup complexity does not increase with the ring 
size but the number of nodes, the finger table size does. Moreover using an extremely 
large ring costs many big integer operations which degrades the performance. To reduce 
the ring size, we define a sampling function: 
SAM(x, mask) = ci1ci2…cik,                                    (5.4) 
where ik is the position which bit is “1” in mask, and cik is the bit at position ik of x. For 
example, if x = 10011, and mask = 11001, then i1, i2, i3 = 1, 2, 5, and the 1st, 2nd, 5th bits 
of x will be extracted to form SAM(x, mask) = 101. 
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In addition to the finger table and successor list, our scheme needs a service table 
and a directory table in each node. The service table stores the information related to the 
services this node will provide or transfer. In contrast, the directory table stores the data 
related to the services which other nodes will provide or transfer. The protocol for node 
A to add a service description D is described as follows:  
Protocol: Add Service Description 
(i)  A computes the CHORD key SAM(MLBF(D), mask) to locate node B. 
(ii)  A and B compute K = SH1(A, B). Terminate if K < 0. 
(iii)  A sends to B the following messages: 
MLBF(D), pub, signpri(MLBF(D))                                    (5.5) 
These messages are needed by service reservations and transfers in the future. 
(iv)  A randomly generates R and sends encR(K) to B. R is needed by A to remove the 
service description from the ring in the future.  
The messages in (5.5) are came from A’s reservation credential if A is the service 
consumer who wants to transfer the reservation. If A is a service provider, (pri, pub) is a 
private-public key pair randomly generated by A. (pri, pub) will be used to authenticate 
the service provider on redemption of services described by D. Different (pri, pub) key 
pairs are used for different service descriptions to guarantee unlinkability of the service 
provider. At the end of the protocol, the following entries are added to A’s service table: 
D, K, R, pub.                                                    (5.6) 
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If A is a service provider, then it also stores pri in this entry of service table. If A 
is a service consumer, then it stores the TZKP cascaded credential that it used to receive 
the service reservation. The following entries are added to B’s directory table: 
MLBF(D), LCA, pub, signpri(MLBF(D)), K, encR(K)                   (5.7) 
B only knows MLBF(D) but not D. Thus, it protects the contents of D from B, even B is 
responsible for matching D with the requests from other nodes in the future.  
Fig. 25 depicts the scenario from which node 5 wants to add the XML document 
D to the ring. Node 5 adds the first level element a0, to BF1, the second level elements b0 
and b1, to BF2, and the third level elements c0, c1, d0 and d1 to BF3. It adds all elements to 
BF0. The output of each level is concatenated to become: 
MLBF(D) = 0111 0101 0011 0111 (decimal: 30007)                (5.8) 
Then, node 5 samples the above result by the mask: 
mask = 1000 0001 0011 0011                                 (5.9) 
As shown by the bolded bits above, the sampled result is 011111, which decimal is 31. 
 
 
Fig. 25: Mapping XML document to CHORD key 
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Node 5 uses 31 as the key to locate the node to store 30007 as depicted in Fig. 26 
and Table 13. First, node 5 checks that 31 is larger than its location 5. Thus, it looks up 
its finger table. Since 31 is in between 5 + 16 = 21 and 5 + 32 = 37, node 5 forwards (5, 
30007, …) to suc(21) = 32. Then, node 32 checks that the sampled result of 30007 is 31, 
which is smaller than its location 32. It means node 32 is the node to store (5, 30007,…). 
Node 32 does SH protocol with node 5, exchanges the data as in step (iii) and (iv) of the 
protocol, and stores the data in its directory table.  
 
Fig. 26: Add service description. 
 
Table 13: Scenario for adding service description. 
Form To Lookup Key Finger Table 
5 5 31 > 5 suc(5+16) = 32 
suc(5+32) = 38 
(21 ≤ 31 ≤ 37) 
5 32 31 ≤  32 -- 
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DELETE SERVICE DESCRIPTION: Only the user who added the service description 
can delete it. The authentication is done by checking the knowledge of R created in the 
add service description protocol. Therefore, even if A changes its location, as long as it 
has the knowledge of R, it can still prove the authority to remove the service description 
from the ring. The protocol for node A to remove D from the ring is described as follows 
Protocol: Delete Service Description 
(i)  A computes the CHORD key SAM(MLBF(D), mask) to locate node B. 
(ii)  A and B compute L = SH1(A, B). Terminate if L < 0. 
(iii)  A sends MLBF(D) to B. 
(iv)  B checks (MLBF(D), …, K, …) from its directory table and send EL(K) to A.  
(v)  A decrypts EL(K) and checks if K matches the entry in service table. If it does, 
retrieve R and send EL(R) to B. 
(vi)   B decrypts EL(R) and checks whether ER(K) equals to the entry in its directory 
table. If it does, delete the entry from the directory table.  
At the end of the protocol, the following entries are removed from B’s directory table: 
MLBF(D), LCA, pub, signpri(MLBF(D)), K, encR(K)               (5.10) 
SERVICE MATCHING: A registered user can post service request for service matching. 
The first concern is on the matching of multiple results. In CHORD, lookup is a one-to-
one matching. On the contrary, XML-based query matches multiple service descriptions 
resided in different nodes on the ring. For example, the service request denoted by 0101 
matches all service descriptions represented by 0101, 0111, 1101, and 1111. An intuitive 
approach is to rewrite the original request to all matched combinations. However, it will 
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generate massive number of requests when many zeros are in the original request. An 
alternative approach is to circulate the request around the ring and receive replies from 
the nodes which have a match in their service tables. Yet, it generates as many requests 
as the number of nodes. Thus, we extend CHORD’s lookup protocol to reach multiple 
matched results. Our solution also circulates the request but we skip a large number of 
nodes by using finger tables. The request is circulating around the successors of matched 
key, e.g., suc(0101), suc(0111), suc(1101), and suc(1111) instead of circulating around 
every node in the ring. The number of nodes visited can be reduced if there are common 
successors. For example, it is likely that suc(0101) = suc(0111) because 0101 and 0111 
are near in the ring. In order to derive the potentially matched CHORD keys from the 
original request, we define the ⊕ operator as follows:  
z = y ⊕ x,                                                  (5.11) 
where the number of bits in x equals to the number of zeros in y, and z is obtained by 
replacing the zero bits in y by the corresponding bits in x. For example, 0101 ⊕ 00 = 
0101, 0101 ⊕ 01 = 0111, 0101 ⊕ 10 = 1101, and 0101 ⊕ 11 = 1111. 
The second concern is about the number of results returned. A consumer may 
receive an extremely large number of matched results if the request is too general, e.g., 
0000, which could crash the node unintentionally. A straightforward approach is to 
hardcode the protocol to return the first k results. But then the node may not be able to 
reach other matched results every time using the same request although the unreachable 
results may be more useful. Therefore, we take a probabilistic approach that different k 
results are returned each time. To avoid the request from circulating forever in the ring, 
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we also keep track of a hop count to cease further searching of results, even fewer than k 
results have been return. The protocol for node A to match a service request T on the ring 
is described as follows. 
Protocol: Service Matching 
(i)  A uses SAM(MLBFQ(T), mask) to locate node B. 
(ii)  A and B compute K = SH1(A, B). Terminate if K < 0. 
(iii)  A sends the following to B:  
(LCA, MLBFQ(T), inc_count, result_count, hop_count)  
result_count = max number of results to be returned 
hop_count = max number of nodes to be visited.  
inc_count = number of matched key tested so far 
inc_count is initially 0 from the original requestor A. 
(iv)  B checks its directory table. For each table entry, if SAM( MLBF(D), mask ) and 
SAM( MLBFQ(T), mask ) match and result_count > 0, then B sends the following 
entries to LCA with probability = p: 
MLBF(D), LC, pub, signpri(MLBF(D)), MLBFQ(T)              (5.12) 
For each result sent, B decreases result_count by one. 
Terminate if hop_count = 0, or result_count = 0, or inc_count cannot be further 
increased, i.e., 11…1.  
(v)  B increases inc_count by one and then locates suc(x) where x = SAM(MLBFQ(T), 
mask) ⊕ inc_count.  
(vi)  B and suc(x) compute K = SH1(A, B). Terminate if K < 0.  
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 (vii)  B decreases hop_count by one and sends suc(x) the following messages: 
(LCA, MLBFQ(T), result_count, hop_count, inc_count)          (5.13) 
LCA instead of LCB is used in the sent message so that the results will be sent to 
the original requestor.  
(viii)  B and suc(x) repeat from (iv) as A and B did.  
At the end of the protocol, A receives a collection of results which potentially match the 
wanted services.  
Fig. 27 depicts the scenario from which node 2 matches the service request T = 
/a0/b0/c0 on the ring. The element names a0, b0, c0 are respectively added to BF1, BF2, 
and BF3. All element names are added to BF0. The output of each level is concatenated:  
MLBFQ(T) = 0111 0101 0001 0011 (decimal: 29971)            (5.14) 
Then, node 2 samples the result in (5.14) by the mask in (5.15): 
mask = 1000 0001 0011 0011                              (5.15) 
As shown by the bolded bits above, the sampled result is 010111. As depicted in Table 
14, by substituting the 0 bits in 010111 by 00, 01, 10 and 11, there are four keys derived 
from the original request: 23, 31, 55, and 63 (in decimal). Instead of routing the request 
from node 2 to suc(23), 2 to suc(31), 2 to suc(55), and 2 to suc(63), we forward the 
request from 2 to suc(23), suc(23) to suc(31), suc(31) to suc(55), and suc(55) to suc(63). 
The detailed steps are presented in Fig. 28 and Table 15.  
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Fig. 27: Mapping from XPath to CHORD key. 
 
Table 14: Computations for the next CHORD key. 
Binary Decimal ⊕  Representation 
010111 23 23 ⊕  0 
011111 31 23 ⊕  1 
110111 55 23 ⊕  2 
111111 63 23 ⊕  3 
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Fig. 28: Matching service request. 
 
 
Table 15: Scenario for matching service request. 
From To Lookup Key Directory Table Finger Table 
2 2 23⊕ 0=23 > 2 -- suc(2+16) = 20 
suc(2+32) = 20 
(18 ≤ 23 ≤ 34) 
2 20 23⊕ 0=23 > 20 -- suc(20+2) = 32 
suc(20+4) = 32 
(22 ≤ 23 ≤ 24) 
20 32 23⊕ 0=23 ≤  32 
23⊕ 1=31 ≤  32 
23⊕ 2 =55> 32 
21, 23, 23, 25,  30, 31 suc(32+16)=49 
suc(32+32)=2 
(48 ≤ 55 ≤ 64) 
32 49 23⊕ 2=55 > 49 -- suc(49+4)=53 
suc(49+8)=0 
(53 ≤ 55 ≤ 57) 
49 53 23⊕ 2=55 > 53 -- suc(53+2)=0 
suc(53+4)=0 
(55 ≤ 55 ≤ 57) 
53 0 23⊕ 2=55 ≤  0+64 
23⊕ 3=63 ≤  0+64 
54, 57, 59, 63 -- 
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First, node 2 checks that 23 is larger than its location. Thus, it looks up its finger 
table. Since 23 is in between 2 + 16 = 18 and 2 + 32 = 34, node 2 forwards (2, 29971, 0, 
…) to suc(18) = 20. Node 20 checks that the sampled result of 29971 is 23. 23 ⊕ 0 is 
larger than its location so it looks up its finger table. Since 23 is in between 20 + 2 = 22 
and 20 + 4 = 24, it forwards (2, 29971, 0, …) to suc(22) = 32.  
Node 32 checks that the sampled result of 29971 is 23. 23 ⊕ 0 is smaller than its 
location. Thus, it looks up its directory table and finds two entries match. The results are 
returned to node 2. Next, it updates inc_count from 0 to 1, and computes 23 ⊕ 1 = 31. It 
finds that suc(31) is node 32 itself thus it looks up its directory table and finds one entry 
match. This entry was added by node 5 in the previous example so node 32 returns the 
result (5, 30007, …) to node 2. Node 32 updates inc_count from 1 to 2, and computes 23 
⊕ 2 = 55. Since 55 is in between 32 + 16 = 48 and 32 + 32 = 64, node 32 forwards (2, 
29971, 2,…) to suc(48) = 49.  
Similarly, the request is forwarded from node 49 to node 53 and then to node 0. 
Node 0 checks that the sampled result of 29971 is 23. 23 ⊕ 2 = 55 is smaller than its 
location 0 + 64 (the addition of 64 is needed if the sending node’s location is larger than 
the receiving node’s location) so it looks up its directory table and finds no entry match. 
Node 0 updates inc_count from 2 to 3 and computes 23 ⊕ 3 = 63. It finds that suc(63) is 
node 0 itself. Thus, it looks up its directory table and finds one entry match. The result is 
returned to node 2. At this point, node 0 cannot further increments inc_count. Thus, the 
protocol is terminated.  
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GROUP MATCHING: Using the LCs resulted from service matching, user A can contact 
some of these locations and execute L = SH2(A, B). If B is in the same group, B will send 
D to A. A does an exact matching of D and T. If they are matched (not only potentially 
matched), then A and B can continue to the transaction phase for reservation of services 
or transfer of reservation. L will be used as the symmetric key to build a secure channel 
for the transaction phase. The secure channel will not be explicitly mentioned in the rest 
of the discussions.  
JOIN/LEAVE/FAILRE OF NODE: Identical to CHORD but the users located at the ends 
of the broken ring will need to execute K = SH1(A,B) to verify their precedent and the 
successor as registered users. In additional to the key-value pair, they also need to move 
their service tables and directory tables to the precedent and the successor.  
 
3. Service transaction phase 
 
SERVICE RESERVATION: Identical to TZKP except that pub is not well-known public-
key but received during the service matching phase. The reservation credential becomes 
RS = (pub, signpri(MLBF(D)), signpri(W, X, T, MLBF(D)), T, MLBF(D))   (5.16) 
RESERVATION TRANSFER: Identical to TZKP except that the consumer who transfers 
the service reservation needs to remove its service description after the transfer.  
SERVICE REDEMPTION: Identical to TZKP except that the consumer needs to verify 
the service provider is the one who originally posted the service description. It can be 
checked by sending a random string to the service provider. If the service provider can 
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correctly sign the random string by the private key pri, then it is the one who originally 
posted the service description.   
 
D. Experimental Results 
 
Matching of multiple results for service discovery in P2P networks is an open 
problem [93]. It is easy to see that our protocol takes O(n) time to match all results in the 
worst case, where n is the number of nodes on the ring. Nevertheless this complexity is 
inevitable because the service consumer can always choose the request which returns all 
services from all nodes. Thus, average run time is a more interesting attribute to study.  
In this experiment, we evaluate the run time for the service matching protocol to 
demonstrate its feasibility in a large-scale P2P environment. The run time is estimated 
by multiplying the average number of hops required to match the services by the average 
run time required to talk to a node one hop away and do the secret handshake. Note that 
the average run time can be influenced by different distributions of nodes on the ring, 
different natures of service descriptions and requests, and different networking quality. 
The simulation does not cover all situations but provides a good reference to understand 
the performance of the system in practice. 
 
 
 
 
 120 
1. Average hop count 
 
In this simulation, we evaluate the average number of hops that a request needs 
to route through for all potentially matched services. The average values are obtained by 
1000 runs of the experiment on a 15-bit simulated CHORD ring. In each run, a certain 
number of nodes are randomly distributed on the ring and a mask is randomly generated. 
To demonstrate a more realistic XML workload, we select 45 XML documents from the 
XML common business library (xCBL) [94] and add them to the ring. Then, we derive 
77 XPaths (shown in Appendix C) from the 45 XML documents as the service requests. 
We randomly select a node from the ring fire each request. The MLBF contains 8 layers. 
Each layer contains 300 hash functions. Each hash function is a variant of SHA-1 [95] to 
produce a 160-bit output. The 160-bit MLBF output is sampled by the mask into a 15-bit 
key for lookup on the CHORD ring. The hop counts for different number of nodes on the 
ring are shown in Table 16. It shows that for every 10 times increase nodes, the average 
hop counts increases by 3 folds, when the number of nodes increases from 10 to 10000. 
Such a relationship is shown in Fig. 29 by the log scales on both axes. In reality, we may 
need fewer hop counts because we are interested in k results only but not all of them. 
 
Table 16: Average hop count for returning all results. 
Number of Nodes 10 100 1000 10000 
Number of Hops 5 17 49 141 
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Fig. 29: Average hop count for returning all results. 
 
2. Average runtime per hop 
 
In this experiment, we evaluate the average run time needed by a node to talk 
with a node one hop away and do secret handshake. We implemented the proposed SH 
protocol in C++ with MIRACL library [96]. We run the protocol on an Intel Pentium-4 
2-GHz processor with 256-Mbyte RAM under Windows XP environment. The bilinear 
map e is Tate pairing. G1 is an additive group of points of a supersingular elliptic curve 
with prime order q = 2159 + 217 + 1, and G2 is a multiplicative group of the finite field 
F*q2. The Tate pairing is computed based on the supersingular elliptic curve y2 = x3 + x. 
The pairing parameters chosen above are based on [92] which deliver a security level 
comparable to the 1024-bit RSA cryptography. We used the built-in hash function in the 
MIRACL for H1. We used SHA-1 [95] for H2. Table 17 and Table 18 summarize the 
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experimental results. We measure the average time and message size in 100 runs of 
secret handshakes between two group members. Main computations are 2 pairing 
operations, 2 elliptic curve point multiplications, H1 and H2. The pairing operations are 
the most costly operations, but they consume 65 milliseconds only. Our protocol is more 
efficient than the schemes in [7], which have similar functions but cost 6 pairing 
operations. The total message size is smaller than 350 bytes which is compact enough 
for most applications with reasonable bandwidth.  
 
Table 17: Average runtime of our secret handshake protocols 
 Pairing Computations Point Multiplications H1, H2 Total 
Time (ms) 32.5 × 2 << 1 << 1 65 
 
Table 18: Average message size of our secret handshake protocols 
 nA1,nB1 WA1,WB1 VA,B,VB,A Total 
Size (bytes) 40 bytes 256 bytes 40 bytes 336 bytes 
 
 
 
 To evaluate the average run time for a node to reach another node one hop away, 
we simulate a 15-bit CHORD ring with 14 nodes on 100Mb Ethernet. It takes about 2.4 
milliseconds reach from one node to another node. Therefore, we estimate that each hop 
count requires 65 + 2.4 = 67.4 milliseconds. Based on this estimation, we summarize the 
total run times in Table 19 for different scenarios from Table 16. 
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Table 19: Total Runtime for different number of nodes 
Number of Nodes 10 100 1000 10000 
Number of Hops 5 17 49 141 
Avg. Run Time (s) 0.3 1.1 3.3 9.5 
 
As shown above, our protocol returns all potentially matched services from 1000 
nodes in fewer than 4 seconds, showing the practicality to be deployed in a large scale 
P2P environment. 
 
E. Summary 
 
In this section, we propose a management framework for the privacy-preserved 
service oriented architecture (SOA). Service providers and consumers first establish a 
trust relationship in the peer-to-peer (P2P) network CHORD, before they are willing to 
exchange sensitive data. The key challenge is to maintain the balance of security and 
privacy in a distributed and dynamic P2P environment without centralized supervisions 
during the regular operations. To achieve this, we propose to use multi-layer Bloom 
filters (MLBF) to match service requests/descriptions without unveiling their contents 
during the service discovery phase. We also propose to use secret handshake (SH) 
protocol to match group membership between service providers and consumers without 
unveiling their group identities on mismatched events. After service matching and group 
matching, the two users can execute the transaction by the timed zero-knowledge proof 
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(TZKP) protocol to perform such functions as service reservation, redemption, and 
transfers of reservations, without unveiling their user identities under normal situations. 
Integration of above cryptographic tools forms strong foundation of security and privacy 
protection for the next generation communication model. Preliminary experimental 
results show that our system is practical for a large P2P network.  
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VI. SUMMARY 
 
The objective of this research work is to develop an anonymous, authentic, and 
accountable (AAA) management framework for secure resource allocations based on the 
E-cash paradigm. While most existing resource management schemes emphasize on one 
or two of the AAA attributes, E-cash provides solid knowledge bases to maintain fragile 
balance between them. Nevertheless, since E-cash was originally designed for monetary 
applications, directly applying E-cash to secure resource allocations may not be the most 
efficient and effective way. Therefore, we proposed several management solutions to 
tailor E-cash algorithms for secure resource management.  
Transferability management is important for transferring of resource ownership 
from principal to another principal. E-cash algorithms allow anonymous transfer without 
centralized supervisions but the transfer operation is expensive under Chaum-Pederson’s 
general transferability model (GTM). We proposed a timed zero-knowledge proof 
(TZKP) protocol which drastically reduces the storage and communication overheads 
needed in the traditional E-cash model. The key idea is manipulate the anonymity 
control variables in Eng-Okamoto’s general disposable authentication (GDA) model so 
that session time and source of transfer can be embedded into the cryptographic 
construct as a deciphering condition of user identity. With proper adjustment on the 
deciphering condition, the user can reuse a token for multiple legitimate transfers 
without losing anonymity as in GTM. At the same time, the service provider can discard 
expired credentials without sacrificing the accountability on double-transfer violators.  
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Divisibility management allows a principal to organize a chunk of resources into 
different divisions with minimum number of tokens. Traditional divisibility management 
solutions use a binary tree to represent different subdivisions of the resources. We 
proposed a hypercube based divisibility framework which supports much more flexible 
divisibility configurations than Eng-Okamoto’s general divisibility model (GDM). The 
flexibility in is traded from the overheads in tracking of a new type of double-transfer 
violation called shared-node violation. We analyzed the cryptographic constraints and 
found that it is very costly to guarantee all AAA constraints at the same time in the 
hypercube-based scheme. However, using a slightly relaxed anonymity constraint, and 
integrating the scheme with practically used resource allocation rules, we found that the 
overheads can be significantly reduced.  
Based on the above AAA management solutions, we proposed a privacy-
preserving service oriented architecture on the peer-to-peer (P2P) network. By TZKP 
protocol, user identities can be protected in transaction phase. To offer privacy 
protection in the service discovery phase, we extended CHORD’s lookup protocol to 
enable XML query using the multi-layer Bloom filter (MLBF). The proposed solution 
allows service consumers to query peer nodes for wanted services while the peer nodes 
do not have the knowledge on both the query and service contents. In addition, we 
proposed a new secret handshake (SH) protocol to screen strangers based on their 
qualification, privileges, capabilities, or trust levels represented by their group, before 
the ownership of resources is transferred to the unknown collaborators. SH protocol 
allows two users to verify whether they belong to the same group while not leaking their 
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group identities upon failure of verifications. Our protocol allows the user to reuse the 
SH token for multiple secret handshake instances without linking the user identity. We 
showed that our SH protocol is more efficient than existing schemes with similar 
functions. Experimental results showed that E-cash based secure resource management 
framework is practical for AAA management in the large-scale distributed network.  
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APPENDIX A: ANONYMITY GUARANTEE WITH THREE VERTICES  
 
Following is a sketch of proof to show that the minimum number of vertices that 
can constitute an anonymity hazard is four, regardless the hypercube size. Let p, q1, q2 
are spent without causing double spending offense. We now show that anonymity hazard 
is impossible by using these three vertices. Without loss of generality, we assume that n 
> dim(q1) ≥ dim(q2) > dim(p) and the trivial case of  vertices at the root level (n) is not 
considered because spending a root vertex will cause double spending with any other 
spent vertices. We also do not consider dim(q1) = dim(p) or dim(q2) = dim(p), because in 
a top-down approach only vertices at dimension higher than dim(p) are useful to 
compute the delegation key of p. Since d(p, q1) > 0 and d(p, q2) > 0, there is at least one 
0/1 bit difference between the (p, q1) pair and between the (p, q2) pair. We assume that 
the bit differences occur at the ith bit of the (p, q1) pair and the jth bit of the (p, q2) pair.  
Fig. 30 depicts the case when dim(q2) < (n-1), so that every vertex at dim(q1) 
contains at least two bits which are 0 or 1. Let p2 be an ancestor of p at dim(q2), whose ith 
and jth bits are identical to those of p. Consider the path from p2 to p. The jth bit assures 
that all vertices on this path are non-susceptible to q2, implying that none of them are in 
uKDM({q2}) which contains vertices susceptible to q2. We extend this path to p1, which is 
an ancestor of p at dim(q1) with its ith bit identical to that in p. Similarly, the ith bit 
ensures that all vertices on the new path (from p1 to p) are not susceptible to q1, implying 
that none of them are in uKDM({q1}). Each vertex on this path has at least one parent who 
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is in neither uKDM({q1}) nor uKDM({q2}). Thus, the delegation key of p cannot be 
computed and anonymity hazard can never occur in this case.  
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Fig. 30: Anonymity hazard impossible with 3 vertices. 
 
Next, we consider the case when dim(q2) = (n-1). In this case, it also implies that 
dim(q1) = (n-1). The only possible combinations of bit pair at the ith and the jth positions 
of q1 and q2 are (0,×), (1,×), (×,0), and (×,1), because at dimension (n-1) every vertex 
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contains only one bit which is not ×. Furthermore, (×,×) is not allowed, otherwise they 
will cause a double spending offense with p. The only possible combinations of bit pair 
at the ith and the jth positions of p are (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1). Since d(q1, q2) > 0, the 
combinations for q1 and q2 to co-exist could be {(0,×), (1,×)} or {(×,0), (×,1)}. In either 
case, we cannot find any bit pair from (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1), such that both d(p, q1) 
> 0 and d(p, q2) > 0. Since this is impossible to construct a case for dim(q1) = dim(q2) = 
(n-1), without causing double spending offense, this case is invalid. 
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APPENDIX B: SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR SECRET HANDSHAKE 
 
In this section, we will show that our SH protocol satisfies the following security 
properties: group member impersonation resistant, group member detection resistant, 
and unlinkability. To facilitate the proof, we first define the negligible function as below: 
Definition B.1: A function ε(k) is negligible if for every positive polynomial p(.) and all 
sufficiently large k, ε(k) < p(k)-1.  
Group member impersonation happens when an adversary attempts to convince a 
valid group member that it is also a legal group member. Based on the hardness of BDH 
assumption, an adversary is unable to execute a successful impersonation in our protocol 
without compromising any valid group member or obtaining knowledge of group secret 
g. In other words, our protocol provides impersonation resistance that any polynomial-
time adversary only has negligible probability of cheating as a group member without 
corrupting a member or knowing the group secret in the target group.  
Group detection happens when an adversary attempts to learn whether a user is a 
valid member of a target group by interacting with this user. Based on the hardness of 
BDH assumption, an adversary cannot recognize the membership of a valid user in our 
protocol without compromising other group members or knowing the group secret g. In 
other words, our protocol provides group detection resistance that an adversary only has 
probability p to recognize a target user’s group membership without corrupting any other  
member or knowing the group secret g, where p is at most negligibly larger than 1/2.  
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Unlinkable refer to the case when an eavesdropper cannot recognize whether or 
not two secret handshake instances are performed by the same user. An adversary only 
has probability p to decide whether or not two secret handshake instances are performed 
by the same user in our protocol, where p is at most negligibly larger than 1/2.  
  
1. Group member impersonation resistance 
 
Suppose there is an adversary B who aims at impersonating members of a certain 
group GT. B may communicate with legitimate users in GT, corrupt some valid users and 
obtain their secrets. B picks a target user uT and wants to convince uT that B is a member 
in GT. Group Member Impersonation Game (GMIG) for a randomized polynomial-time 
adversary B is defined as follows:  
(i)  B communicates with users in GT on its own choice. B may compromise certain 
user UC ⊆ U and obtain their secrets.  
(ii)  B selects a target user uT ⊄ UC, where uT ∈ GT.  
(iii) B wants to convince uT that B ∈ GT.  
B wins GMIG if B convinces uT that B is a valid member in GT, i.e., B responds 
correctly to uT in the SH protocol. To prove our scheme is group member impersonation 
resistant, we define the following probability:  
GMIGB = Pr[B wins GMIG]                                       (B.1) 
When B does not compromise any valid user UC ∩ U, the above probability becomes: 
φ=∩ )|( UUB CGMIG = Pr[B wins GMIG | (UC ∩U) = ∅]                  (B.2) 
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The proof needs to show that φ=∩ )|( UUB CGMIG  is negligible for any B in our scheme. The 
proof is based on the group member impersonation resistance property in [6]: 
Theorem B.1 [6]: If BDH problem is hard to probabilistic polynomial time adversary B, 
then φ=∩
*
' GU
BAdvMIG  is negligible.  
φ=∩ *' GU
BAdvMIG defined in [6] represents φ=∩ )|( UUB CGMIG defined in our scheme.  
Corollary B.1: If the SH protocol in [6] is group member impersonation resistant, then 
our SH protocol also holds the property.  
Proof B.1: Suppose B is the adversary. B needs to produce WB1 and V’B,A such that it can 
convince A that VB,A = V’B,A. Since H2 is collision resistant, it requires B to produce WB1 
and UB,A such that UB,A = U’B,A. B does not know sA1⋅KA because KA is kept secret by A, 
and sA1 cannot be computed from WA1 based on the BDH assumption. Suppose B is able 
to find UB,A = U’B,A = e(WB1, sA1⋅KA) with the knowledge of WB1 only. It implies that B 
can also find e(H(IDB), gA⋅H(IDA)) with the knowledge of H(IDB) only. If B can do so, 
then B can win GMIG in [6], which contradicts to Theorem B.1. Therefore, our scheme 
is group member impersonation resistant: 
Theorem B.2: If the BDH problem is hard to probabilistic polynomial time adversary B, 
then φ=∩ )|( UUB CGMIG  is negligible.  
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2. Group member detection resistance 
 
Suppose there is an adversary B who aims at identifying members of a certain 
group GT. B may communicate with legitimate users in GT, compromise some valid 
users, and obtain their secrets. B picks a target user uT and wants to decide whether uT ∈ 
GT. Suppose there is another random simulator r. If B aims at identifying members of 
GT, it should distinguish between uT and r such that B can determine the identity of uT. 
Group Member Detection Game (GMDG) for a randomized, polynomial-time adversary 
B is defined as follows:  
(i)  B communicates with users of target group GT based on its own choice. B may 
compromise certain user UC ⊆ U and obtain their secrets.  
(ii)  B selects a target user uT ⊄ UC, where uT∈ GT.  
(iii)  A random bit b ← {0, 1} is flipped. 
(iv)  There is another random simulator r. 
(v)  If b = 0, B interacts with uT. If b = 1, B interacts with a random simulator r.  
(vi)  B outputs a guess b’ for b.  
B wins GMDG when b’ = b. To prove our scheme is group member detection resistant, 
we define the following probability: 
GMDGB = Pr[B wins GMDG] – 1/2                               (B.3) 
When B does not compromise any valid user UC ∩ U, the above probability becomes: 
φ=∩ )(| UUB CGMDG = Pr[B wins GMDG | (UC ∩ U)=∅] – 1/2           (B.4) 
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The proof needs to show that φ=∩ )(| UUB CGMDG is negligible for any B in our scheme. The 
proof is based on the group member detection resistance property in [6]: 
Theorem B.3 [6]: If BDH problem is hard to probabilistic polynomial time adversary B, 
then φ=∩
*
' GU
BAdvMDG  is negligible. 
φ=∩ *' GU
BAdvMDG defined in [6] represents φ=∩ )(| UUB CGMDG defined in our scheme.  
Corollary B.3: If the SH proposed in [6] is group member detection resistance, then our 
SH protocol also holds the property. 
Proof B.3: Suppose B is an adversary. Suppose B can win GMDG in our scheme without 
knowing sA. Then, B should be able to win GMDG in our scheme when sA is known also. 
When sA is known, our scheme is identical to the scheme in [6], which implies that B can 
win GMDG in [6]. Nevertheless, it contradicts to Theorem B.3. Therefore, our scheme is 
group member detection resistant: 
Theorem B.4: If BDH problem is hard to probabilistic polynomial time adversary B, 
then φ=∩ )(| UUB CGMDG is negligible.  
 
3. Unlinkability 
 
Suppose there is an adversary B who aims at telling whether two executions of 
secret handshake protocol correspond to a same user or not of a target group GT. B may 
communicate with legitimate users of GT, compromise some valid users and obtain their 
secrets. B picks a target user uT. Suppose there are two different executions of secret 
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handshake. B attempts to tell whether the two executions correspond to the same target 
user uT. Identity Linking Game (ILG) for a randomized, polynomial-time adversary B is 
defined as follows:  
(i)  B communicates with users of target group GT based on its own choice. B may 
compromise certain user UC ⊆ U and obtain their secrets.  
(ii)  B selects a target user uT ⊄ UC, where uT∈ GT.  
(iii)  A random bit b ← {0, 1} is flipped. 
(iv)  There are two executions of secret handshake protocol. 
(v)  If b = 0, the two executions are not both performed by uT. If b = 1, the two 
executions are both performed by uT  
(vi)  B outputs a guess b’ for b. 
B wins ILG when b’ = b.  To prove that our scheme is unlinkable, we define the 
following probability: 
ILGB = Pr[B wins ILG] – 1/2                                    (B.5)  
When B does not compromise any valid user UC ∩ U, the above property becomes: 
φ=∩ )(| UUB CILG = Pr[B wins ILG | (UC∩U) = ∅] – 1/2                (B.6) 
The proof needs to show that φ=∩ )(| UUB CILG  is negligible for any B in our scheme. The 
proof is based on the unlinkability property in [6]: 
Theorem B.5 [6]: If BDH problem is hard to probabilistic polynomial time adversary B, 
then the SH protocol in [6] is unlinkable. 
 150 
Corollary B.5: If SH protocol in [6] is unlinkable, then our SH protocol also holds the 
property. 
Proof B.5: Our protocol generates elliptic curve point s⋅H1(ID) as the pseudonym 
instead of assigned pseudonym “id” as in [6]. Based on the hardness of Elliptic Curve 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [8], probabilistic polynomial time adversary has 
negligible probability to compute H1(ID) from s⋅H1(ID) without knowing s. Therefore, 
the user can utilize one assigned pseudonym, ID, to generate a set of new pseudonyms as 
si⋅H1(ID), where si are different random integers. The manipulated pseudonyms cannot 
be used to link to the identity of the user. Therefore, our protocol is unlinkable.  
Theorem B.6:  If BDH problem is hard to probabilistic polynomial time adversary B, 
then ILGA|(UC∩U)=∅ is negligible.  
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APPENDIX C: XML AND XPATH DATA SET 
 
We derived 77 XPath expressions from 45 XML documents of xCBL to simulate 
the average hop count needed in a 15-bit CHORD ring. The 77 XPaths are shown below: 
 
/AccountCheckRequest/AccountCheckRequestHeader/AccountCheckRequestIssueDate 
/AccountCheckRequest/ListOfAccountCheckRequestDetail/AccountCheckRequestDetail/AccountCheckRe
questBaseItemDetail/LineItemNum 
/AdvanceShipmentNotice/ASNHeader/ASNOrderNumber/core:BuyerOrderNumber 
/AdvanceShipmentNotice/ASNHeader/ASNParty/BuyerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/ApplicationResponse/ApplicationResponseHeader/ApplicationResponseSender/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/ApplicationResponse/ApplicationResponseHeader/BusinessDocumentTypeCoded 
/AvailabilityCheckRequest/AvailabilityCheckRequestHeader/SellerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/AvailabilityCheckRequest/ListOfAvailabilityCheckRequestItemDetail/AvailabilityCheckRequestItemDetail/Li
neItemNum/core:BuyerLineItemNum 
/AvailabilityCheckResult/AvailabilityCheckResultHeader/AvailabilityCheckResultID 
/AvailabilityCheckResult/AvailabilityCheckResultHeader/BuyerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/AvailabilityToPromise/AvailabilityToPromiseHeader/AvailabilityToPromisePurpose/AvailabilityToPromisePu
rposeCoded 
/AvailabilityToPromise/AvailabilityToPromiseHeader/AvailabilityDeliveryOption/AvailabilityDeliveryOptionCo
ded 
/AvailabilityToPromiseResponse/AvailabilityToPromiseResponseHeader/AvailabilityToPromiseRefernece/c
ore:RefNum 
/AvailabilityToPromiseResponse/AvailabilityToPromiseResponseHeader/InitiatingParty/core:PartyID/core:Id
ent 
/ChangeOrder/ChangeOrderHeader/ChangeOrderNumber/BuyerChangeOrderNumber 
/ChangeOrder/ChangeOrderHeader/SellerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/ErrorResponse/CategoryCoded 
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/FXRateRequest/FXRateRequestHeader/Language/core:LanguageCoded 
/FXRateResponse/FXRateResponseHeader/FXRateRequestID/core:RefNum 
/FXRateResponse/ListOfFXRateResponseDetail/FXRateResponseDetail/ReferenceCurrency/core:Currenc
yCoded 
/GetERPData/GetERPDataIssueDate 
/GetERPData/ListOfKeyField/KeyField/KeyFieldName 
/GetERPDataResponse/ReceiverParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/GetERPDataResponse/ErrorInfo/core:CompletionMsg/core:Language/core:LanguageCoded 
/GetOrder/ListOfPOReferences/POReferences 
/GoodsReceipt/GoodsReceiptHeader/GoodsReceiptParty/ShipFromParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/InventoryReport/ListOfInventoryReportDetail/InventoryReportDetail/TotalInventoryQuantity/core:UnitOfMea
surement/core:UOMCoded 
/Invoice/InvoiceHeader/InvoiceLanguage/core:LanguageCoded/ 
/Invoice/InvoiceDetail/ListOfInvoiceItemDetail/InvoiceItemDetail/InvoiceBaseItemDetail/LineItemNum/core:B
uyerLineItemNum 
/Invoice/InvoiceDetail/ListOfInvoiceItemDetail/InvoiceItemDetail/InvoiceBaseItemDetail/InvoicedQuantity/cor
e:UnitOfMeasurement/core:UOMCoded 
/InvoiceResponse/InvoiceResponseHeader/InvoiceReference/core:RefNum 
/InvoiceResponse/InvoiceResponseHeader/InvoiceParty/BuyerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/Order/OrderHeader/OrderNumber/BuyerOrderNumber 
/Order/OrderHeader/OrderParty/BuyerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/OrderConfirmation/OrderConfirmationDetail/ListOfOrderConfirmationItemDetail/OrderConfirmationItemDet
ail/OrderConfirmationDetailReferences/PurchaseOrderReference/core:BuyerOrderNumber 
/OrderConfirmation/OrderConfirmationDetail/ListOfOrderConfirmationItemDetail/ItemDetail/BaseItemDetail/
TotalQuantity/core:UnitOfMeasurement/core:UOMCoded 
/OrderConfirmationResponse/OrderConfirmationResponseHeader/SellerOrderConfirmationReference/core:
RefNum 
/OrderConfirmationResponse/OrderConfirmationResponseHeader/OrderConfirmationResponseParty/Buyer
Party/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/OrderRequest/OrderRequestHeader/OrderRequestCurrency/core:CurrencyCoded 
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/OrderResponse/OrderResponseHeader/OrderResponseIssueDate 
/OrderResponse/OrderResponseHeader/OrderResponseNumber/BuyerOrderResponseNumber 
/OrderStatusRequest/OrderStatusRequestHeader/BuyerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/OrderStatusRequest/ListOfOrderStatusRequestDetail/OrderStatusRequestDetail/OrderStatusReference/B
uyerReferenceNumber 
/OrderStatusResult/OrderStatusResultHeader/BuyerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/OrderStatusResult/ListOfOrderStatusResultDetail/OrderStatusResultDetail/OrderStatusResultReference/O
rderStatus/core:StatusEvent/core:StatusEventCoded 
/PaymentRequest/PaymentRequestHeader/PayerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident/ 
/PaymentRequest/PaymentRequestHeader/FinancialServicesParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/PaymentRequest/ListOfPaymentRequestDetail/PaymentRequestDetail/FinancialInstitutionDetail/core:Rece
ivingFinancialInstitution/core:AccountDetail/core:AccountName1 
/PaymentRequest/ListOfPaymentRequestDetail/PaymentRequestDetail/PaymentRequestParty/PayeeParty/
core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/PaymentRequestAcknowledgment/PaymentRequestAcknHeader/FinancialServicesParty/core:PartyID/core
:Ident 
/PaymentRequestAcknowledgment/ListOfPaymentRequestAcknDetail/PaymentRequestAcknDetail/Paymen
tDocumentID/core:RefNum 
/PaymentStatusRequest/PaymentStatusRequestHeader/FinancialServicesParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/PaymentStatusRequest/ListOfPaymentStatusRequestDetail/PaymentStatusRequestDetail/PaymentReque
stID/core:RefNum 
/PaymentStatusResponse/PaymentStatusResponseHeader/PaymentStatusRequestID/core:RefNum 
/PaymentStatusResponse/ListOfPaymentStatusResponseDetail/PaymentStatusResponseDetail/ListOfPay
mentException/PaymentException/PaymentExceptionCoded 
/PlanningSchedule/PlanningScheduleHeader/ScheduleParty/SellerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/PlanningSchedule/ListOfLocationGroupedPlanningDetail/LocationGroupedPlanningDetail/ListOfLocationPl
anningItemDetail/LocationPlanningItemDetail/BasePlanningDetail/LineItemNum/core:BuyerLineItemNum 
/PlanningScheduleResponse/PlanningScheduleResponseHeader/BuyerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
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/PlanningScheduleResponse/ListOfLocationGroupedPlanningResponse/LocationGroupedPlanningRespons
e/LocationGroupedPlanningDetail/ListOfLocationPlanningItemDetail/LocationPlanningItemDetail/BasePlann
ingDetail/LineItemNum/core:BuyerLineItemNum 
/PlanningScheduleResponse/ListOfLocationGroupedPlanningResponse/LocationGroupedPlanningRespons
e/LocationGroupedPlanningDetail/ListOfLocationPlanningItemDetail/ListOfScheduleDetail/ScheduleDetail/S
cheduleQuantities/core:QuantityCoded/core:UnitOfMeasurement/core:UOMCoded 
/PriceCheckRequest/PriceCheckRequestHeader/BuyerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/PriceCheckRequest/ListOfPriceCheckRequestItemDetail/PriceCheckRequestItemDetail/LineItemNum/core
:BuyerLineItemNum 
/PriceCheckResult/PriceCheckResultHeader/ShipToParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/PriceCheckResult/ListOfPriceCheckResultItemDetail/PriceCheckResultItemDetail/ResultPrice/core:UnitPri
ce/core:UnitPriceValue 
/Quote/QuoteHeader/QuoteParty/BuyerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/RemittanceAdvice/RemittanceAdviceHeader/PaymentCurrency/core:CurrencyCoded 
/RemittanceAdvice/RemittanceAdviceDetail/ListOfSubsidiary/Subsidiary/ListOfInvoicingDetail/InvoicingDeta
il/InvoicingDetailReference/core:PrimaryReference/core:RefNum 
/RequestForQuotation/RequestQuoteHeader/QuoteParty/BuyerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/Requisition/RequisitionHeader/RequisitionParty/RequisitionerParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/ShippingSchedule/ShippingScheduleHeader/ScheduleParty/ShipToParty/core:PartyID/core:Ident 
/ShippingSchedule/ListOfLocationGroupedShippingDetail/LocationGroupedShippingDetail/ListOfLocationS
hippingItemDetail/LocationShippingItemDetailLocationShippingItemDetail/BaseShippingDetail/TotalQuantity
/core:UnitOfMeasurement/core:UOMCoded 
/ShippingSchedule/ListOfLocationGroupedShippingDetail/LocationGroupedShippingDetail/ListOfLocationS
hippingItemDetail/ListOfShipScheduleDetail/ScheduleQuantities/core:QuantityCoded/core:UnitOfMeasurem
ent/core:UOMCoded 
/ShippingScheduleResponse/ShippingScheduleResponseHeader/ResponseType/core:ResponseTypeCode
d 
/ShippingScheduleResponse/ListOfLocationGroupedShippingResponse/LocationGroupedShippingRespons
e/LocationGroupedShippingDetail/ListOfLocationShippingItemDetail/LocationShippingItemDetail/ListOfShip
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ScheduleDetail/ShipScheduleDetail/ScheduleQuantities/core:QuantityCoded/core:UnitOfMeasurement/core
:UOMCoded 
/TimeSeries/TimeSeriesHeader/Language/core:LanguageCoded 
/TimeSeriesRequest/TimeSeriesRequestHeader/TimeSeriesParty 
/TimeSeriesResponse/TimeSeriesResponseHeader/Language/core:LanguageCoded 
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